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The Dynamism of Health Law: 
Expanded Insurance Coverage as the 
Engine of Regulatory Reform 
Gabriel Scheffler 
 
Can law improve the delivery of health care? The predominant view is that law serves 
as a barrier to reforming the health care delivery system. Health law scholars of all stripes 
blame regulations for impeding innovation, limiting competition, and exacerbating 
fragmentation in health care. 
I argue that this view neglects an important—but overlooked—feature of health  
law: the dynamic relationship between laws that expand health insurance coverage and laws 
that regulate the delivery of health care. By expanding health insurance coverage and increasing 
the demand for health care, laws such as Medicare, Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act 
catalyze policymakers to experiment with reforms to delivery system regulations over time. I 
chart the evolution of three key areas of delivery system law, and find that insurance 
expansions have contributed to dramatic changes in each of these areas. 
Recognizing health law’s “dynamism” sheds light on two debates that are central to 
health care reform. First, contrary to what some scholars have argued, it reveals that expanding 
health insurance coverage should be viewed as a catalyst for delivery system reform, rather than 
being in competition with it. Second, it strengthens the case for further expanding health 
insurance coverage. I argue that a dynamic regulatory system is better able to address problems 
of access, costs, and quality; to adapt to other changes in the underlying health care system; 
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A central question in health law and policy concerns how to improve the 
delivery of health care. It is often remarked that the United States spends far more 
money than any other country on health care, and yet Americans on average have 
worse life expectancies than other developed countries.1 Health scholars searching 
for an explanation for this troubling disparity have tended to fixate on flaws in the 
health care “delivery system”—problems with how doctors, hospitals, and other 
health care providers deliver care to patients.2 
 
1. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, HEALTH AT A 
GLANCE 2017: OECD INDICATORS, https://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/Health-at-a-Glance-2017-
Key-Findings-UNITED-STATES.pdf [https://perma.cc/792G-WYTK] ( last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
2. See, e.g., JOHN E. WENNBERG ET AL., IMPROVING QUALITY AND CURBING HEALTH CARE 
SPENDING: OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONGRESS AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION (2008); Donald M. 
Berwick & Andrew D. Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in US Health Care, 307 JAMA 1513 (2012); 
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These flaws are striking. By some estimates, around 25% or 30% of health 
care spending is wasted on things like unnecessary care, administrative costs, and 
outright fraud.3 Spending on medical care varies dramatically across different parts 
of the country, but higher-spending regions do not have discernably better health 
outcomes.4 Thousands of patients die each year as a result of preventable medical 
errors.5 Americans pay prices for medical care that dwarf those in other developed 
countries.6 
Perhaps surprisingly to non-health specialists, many health scholars view the 
law as the root of the problem.7 Richard Saver has called this view the  
“law-as-barrier perspective,” holding that “inflexible legal rules constrain delivery 
system innovation” by “block[ing] value-enhancing opportunities, often in favor of 
incumbent stakeholder interests.”8 
 
William M. Sage, Putting Insurance Reform in the ACA’s Rear-View Mirror, 51  
HOUS. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2014) [hereinafter Sage, Insurance Reform] (noting that policy relating to 
“medical services and products, rather than insurance . . . is commonly if inelegantly termed ‘delivery 
system reform.’”). 
3. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CONTINUOUSLY 
LEARNING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 12–13 (2013); William H. Shrank, Teresa L. Rogstad  
& Natasha Perekh, Waste in the US Health Care System: Estimated Costs and Potential for Savings, 322 
JAMA 1501 (2019). 
4. See, e.g., Elliott S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. 
Part 1: The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care, 138 ANN. INT. MED. 273 (2003); Elliott S. Fisher 
et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 2: Health Outcomes and 
Satisfaction with Care, 138 ANN. INT. MED. 288 (2003). 
5. See INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 26 (2000) 
(estimating that between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die each year as a result of preventable medical 
errors). 
6. Gerard F. Anderson, Peter Hussey & Varduhi Petrosyan, It’s Still the Prices, Stupid: Why the 
US Spends So Much on Health Care, and a Tribute to Uwe Reinhardt, 38 HEALTH AFF. 87 (2019). 
7. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Health Care Fragmentation and How to 
Fix It, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 1, 11 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010) [hereinafter 
Elhauge, Health Care Fragmentation] (“The dominant cause of fragmentation . . . appears to be the law, 
which dictates many of the fragmented features described above and thus precludes alterative [sic] 
organizational structures.”); William M. Sage, Relating Health Law to Health Policy: A Frictional 
Account, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 3, 5–6  
(I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman & William M. Sage eds., 2017) [hereinafter Sage, Relating Health 
Law to Health Policy] (“The concrete—and correct—answer known mainly to health lawyers is that the 
accumulation of professional privileges, judicial decisions, statutes and regulations, and unconditional 
public subsidies over the course of more than a century has severely distorted U.S. healthcare markets 
and crippled competition. Because of long-term regulation, production of health services is fragmented, 
price competition is minimal, entry barriers are high, geographic markets are small and often 
bottlenecked, large insurers and large providers are mutually entrenched, and innovation is channeled 
toward inputs that best suit flawed production processes.”); Timothy S. Jost & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Legal 
Reforms Necessary to Promote Delivery System Innovation, 299 JAMA 2561, 2561 (2008) (“One of the biggest 
barriers to delivery system innovation is the complex web of laws and regulations.”). 
8. Richard S. Saver, Health Law’s Uneasy Relationship with Delivery System Innovation, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 659, 659 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman & William 
M. Sage eds., 2017) [hereinafter Saver, Uneasy Relationship]. Of note, Saver himself argues that law 
“sometimes breaks this pattern quite dramatically” by “act[ing] as an endogenous force for ushering in 
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Many of these criticisms focus on the laws governing the health care delivery 
system. These laws—such as scope of practice restrictions, the corporate practice 
of medicine doctrine, and Certificate of Need (CON) laws—regulate the supply of 
health care. They determine, among other things, which professions and entities can 
legally provide health care services, what types of services they can offer, and the 
conditions and arrangements under which they can provide them.9 Although many 
of these laws have laudable aims, such as protecting public safety and lowering 
health care costs, health care scholars of all stripes have condemned them for 
contributing to some of the most prominent afflictions troubling the health care 
delivery system, including inadequate competition,10 excessive fragmentation,11 and 
a dearth of innovation.12 
To make matters worse, delivery system laws are viewed as difficult to change. 
Scholars have emphasized the “path dependence” of health law,13 and describe 
delivery system laws in particular as stagnant and antiquated.14 According to these 
critics, the problem lies in a combination of inertia and interest group  
dynamics: many of the existing laws are supported by interest groups such as 
 
innovation, sometimes providing needed governmental support to overcome underproduction of 
public-good-like services and delivery models.” Id. at 674. 
9. See Sandra Johnson, Structure of Governmental Oversight of Quality in Healthcare, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 490, 490 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman & William 
M. Sage eds., 2017). 
10. William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Antitrust As Disruptive Innovation in Health  
Care: Can Limiting State Action Immunity Help Save a Trillion Dollars?, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 723,  
730–34 (2017). 
11. See Elhauge, Health Care Fragmentation, supra note 7, at 1 (defining health care fragmentation 
as a situation where “having multiple decision makers make a set of health care decisions that would be 
made better through unified decision making”); Joan K. Krause, Integration, Fragmentation, and Human 
Nature: The Role of the Fraud and Abuse Laws in a Changing Healthcare System, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 852, 852–53 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman & William  
M. Sage eds., 2017) [hereinafter Krause, Integration, Fragmentation, and Human Nature]; Randall  
D. Cebul, James B. Rebitzer, Lowell J. Taylor & Mark E. Votruba, Organizational Fragmentation and Care 
Quality in the U.S. Healthcare System, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (2007). 
12. See, e.g., John H. Cochrane, After the ACA: Freeing the Market for Healthcare, in THE 
FUTURE OF HEALTHCARE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 161 (Anup Malani & Michael H. Schill 
eds., 2015); Lesley H. Curtis & Kevin A. Schulman, Overregulation of Health Care: Musings on Disruptive 
Innovation Theory, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (2006); Jost & Emanuel, supra note 7. 
13. See, e.g., Saver, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8, at 673. 
14. See, e.g., Allison K. Hoffman, What Health Reform Reveals About Health Law, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 49, 61 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman & William 
M. Sage eds., 2017) (“[T]he ACA offers a window into how healthcare regulation can have paralyzing 
effects on innovation, especially in healthcare delivery. Health law has entrenched an antiquated notion 
of medicine—that of a doctor as a revered professional and lone wolf.”); Nicole Huberfeld, Be Not 
Afraid of Change: Time to Eliminate the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 
243, 292 (2004) (characterizing the corporate practice of medicine doctrine as an “archaic doctrine” 
that “does nothing to advance quality of care”); Peter D. Jacobson, Laura M. Napiewocki & Leah  
A. Voigt, Regulating the U.S. Health Care System: Failure in Motion, 36 J. HEALTH  
POL. POL’Y &  L. 583, 585 (2011) (“[T]he rapidly changing health care delivery system requires a 
dynamic regulatory capability, as opposed to the static regulatory approach now dominant.”). 
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physicians and hospitals who benefit from the status quo.15 It is especially difficult 
to change delivery system laws in a way that curbs health care spending, since doing 
so will necessarily lead to reduced profits and job losses in the health care sector.16 
This dynamic was most memorably articulated by the late economist Uwe 
Reinhardt, who pronounced it a “cosmic law” that “Every dollar health 
spending=Someone’s health-care income.”17 
That is not to say there have been no efforts to change the status quo. To the 
contrary, one of the central goals of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) was to improve the delivery system.18 Most prominently, the ACA 
included several initiatives designed to shift from a “fee-for-service” reimbursement 
system, in which providers are reimbursed mainly based on the amount of care that 
they provide (e.g., ordering a test, performing a procedure, etc.), to a “value-based 
system,” in which providers are rewarded for improving patients’ health.19 
Nevertheless, these efforts have been met with some skepticism from many health 
scholars, who among other things point out that they largely leave the existing 
delivery system regulations in place.20 Empirical evidence suggests that so far these 
 
15. See Sage, Relating Health Law to Health Policy, supra note 7, at 13 (“American health law 
strongly supports the medical profession.”); Saver, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8, at 673 (“The ability 
of incumbents to leverage law to block innovation is part of a larger pattern of path dependence 
underlying the delivery system. Existing institutions and structures, as well as historical contingencies, 
have channeled the delivery system along established directions, making more radical, innovative 
change less likely.”); Sage & Hyman, supra note 10, at 732 (“The deep legal architecture of health care 
strongly favors physician self-regulation, and furthers physicians’ professional insularity and  
self-interest.”). 
16. STEVEN BRILL, AMERICA’S BITTER PILL: MONEY, POLITICS, BACKROOM DEALS, AND 
THE FIGHT TO FIX OUR BROKEN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 58 (2015) (quoting Jon Kingsdale) (“Though 
there is broad agreement on the need for containment, any particular cost containment idea means 
reducing revenue flow to somebody, and there is always stronger opposition from even a smaller party 
than there is broad depth of broad support.”); Amitabh Chandra & Jonathan Skinner, Health Care 
Employment Growth and the Future of US Cost Containment, 319 JAMA 1861 (2018). 
17. UWE E. REINHARDT, PRICED OUT: THE ECONOMIC AND ETHICAL COSTS OF AMERICAN 
HEALTH CARE 57 (2019). 
18. See JOHN E. MCDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 155–81 (2011) 
(summarizing the main delivery system reform provisions in the ACA); Sage, Insurance Reform, supra 
note 2, at 1085 (“The ACA’s true breakthrough—and its arguable overreach—is not its attempt to 
universalize health insurance, but its unprecedented goals of also making medical care better and more 
efficient and of improving underlying health.”). 
19. See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, THE ECONOMIC RECORD OF THE 
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: REFORMING THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 1, 47–56 (2016) [hereinafter 
ECONOMIC RECORD]. 
20. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t Worked, 101 
GEO. L.J. 519, 525 (2013) [hereinafter Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats] (characterizing the set of Medicare 
delivery system reforms in the ACA as a “disappointment”); Theodore Marmor & Jonathan 
Oberlander, From HMOs to ACOs: The Quest for the Holy Grail in U.S. Health Policy, 27  
J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1215, 1217 (2012) (“[O]ur history of failed cost control offers sobering lessons 
about exaggerated expectations, the limits of organizational reforms, and the recurring temptation to 
oversell reform ideas like ACOs as panaceas and the harbingers of a new, radically transformed, and 
vastly improved health care system.”); Theodore W. Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers: The Submerged 
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payment reforms have yielded mixed results, leading to some improvements in 
quality measures but relatively modest reductions in health care spending.21 
In this Article, I argue that the “law-as-barrier perspective” neglects a central 
feature of health law: the dynamic relationship between laws that expand health 
insurance (“health care financing laws”) and laws regulating the delivery of health 
care. In contrast to the perception of health law as stagnant and antiquated, I show 
that health care financing laws are in fact largely responsible for what I refer to as 
health law’s “dynamism.” 
By increasing the demand for health care, these laws serve to catalyze state and 
federal policymakers to repeatedly experiment with regulatory reforms designed to 
improve access to health care, ensure quality, and reduce health care costs. The 
expansion of health insurance has contributed to a dynamic system, one in which 
regulators are frequently amending delivery system regulations, then monitoring and 
assessing the consequences of those amendments in practice, and making further 
changes when necessary. This Article illustrates how the enactment of Medicare and 
Medicaid and the ACA have promoted this dynamism by showing how they have 
contributed to substantial changes in three consequential areas of delivery system 
law, each of which is viewed as emblematic of the “law-as-barrier perspective.” 
Uncovering this dynamic relationship also has implications for the future of 
health care reform. It implies that expanding health insurance should be viewed as 
a catalyst for delivery system reform, rather than being in competition with it. 
Contrary to Richard Epstein and David Hyman, who argue that achieving universal 
health insurance without reforming the regulations governing the health care 
delivery system will only further lock us into “the current dysfunctional state of 
affairs,”22 in fact the opposite is true. The history of the interactions between health 
care financing laws and health care delivery laws suggests that future efforts to 
further expand health insurance (whether through enacting a single payer-system or 
through building on the ACA’s existing framework) will create pressure for more 
fundamental reforms to this legal regime—and to the structure of the health care 
delivery system. 
 
Constitution of American Healthcare, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 221 (2012) (“The ACA’s 
architecture is clearly and profoundly solicitous of the extant structures of the medical delivery 
system.”). But see Einer R. Elhauge, Obamacare and the Theory of the Firm, in THE FUTURE OF 
HEALTHCARE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 202, 217 (Anup Malani & Michael H. Schill eds., 2015) 
(pointing out that the Affordable Care Act at least provides regulators with some tools for the federal 
government “to remove legal barriers to efficient health care integration”). 
21. See, e.g., Jonathan Skinner & Amitabh Chandra, The Past and Future of the Affordable Care 
Act, 316 JAMA 497, 497–98 (2016); J. Michael McWilliams et al., Early Performance of Accountable Care 
Organizations in Medicare, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2357 (2016); Austin Frakt, ‘Value’ of Care Was a 
Big Goal. How Did It Work Out?, N.Y. TIMES UPSHOT (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/09/23/upshot/medicare-health-value-costs.html [https://perma.cc/JK3G-7XQP]. 
22. Richard A. Epstein & David A. Hyman, Fixing Obamacare: The Virtues of Choice, 
Competition, and Deregulation, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 493, 516 (2013). 
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I also conclude that this dynamism is a positive force for improving health 
care delivery, and that recognizing it strengthens the case for further expanding 
health insurance coverage. First, expanding insurance coverage prompts reforms 
aimed at addressing problems of access, costs, and quality. Second, it enables 
delivery system regulations to evolve in response to other changes in the health care 
system. Third, it facilitates learning about the optimal regulatory approach by 
enabling policymakers to reverse course and correct mistakes. These advantages are 
especially important in the context of health care, given the strong justifications for 
expanding health insurance coverage, the continual evolution in health care 
technology and modes of delivering patient care, and the uncertainty as to the 
optimal strategy for regulating the health care delivery. 
As far as I am aware, this is the first work to explore the general relationship 
between expanding health insurance coverage and reforming health care delivery 
laws. Kenneth Arrow foreshadowed health law’s dynamism in his classic 1963 
article, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, albeit in very general 
terms.23 Other scholars such as Paul Starr and John Kingdon have pointed out how 
the enactment of Medicare precipitated new regulations aimed at reducing health 
care costs in particular,24 while Joan Krause, Frances Miller, and Clark Havighurst 
have examined the implications of health insurance expansions for fraud and abuse 
laws.25 Yet these earlier works do not take a holistic view of how health care 
financing laws influence health care delivery laws by influencing the demand for 
health care, nor do they fully develop the implications of this relationship for health 
law and policy. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews three of the most prominent 
and widely criticized types of health care delivery system laws—scope of practice 
restrictions, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, and CON  
regulations—and outlines the prevailing view of these laws as barriers to improving 
the delivery of health care. 
Part II then examines why expanding health insurance coverage has served to 
transform these laws. It first shows that increasing insurance coverage serves to 
increase the demand for health care through several channels; next, drawing on 
work by Arrow and Kingdon, it explains why this increase in demand in turn creates 
pressure to reform health care delivery laws. 
Part III then illustrates this causal chain by showing how Medicare and 
Medicaid—and to a lesser extent, the ACA—have led to changes in each of the 
 
23. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53  
AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963) [hereinafter Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care]. 
24. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 106–07 
(2011); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 398–404 (1982) 
[hereinafter STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION]. 
25.  See Clark C. Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law—We Need to Talk!, 19 HEALTH 
AFF. 84, 88–90 (2000); Joan H. Krause, Fraud in Universal Coverage: The Usual Suspects (And Then Some), 
55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1151 (2007); Frances H. Miller, Doctors’ Conflicts of Interest (& Altruism) in the United 
States and Great Britain, 27 IND. L. REV. 687, 693 (1994). 
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aforementioned three areas of delivery system law. Somewhat surprisingly, these 
changes have not been consistently pro-regulatory or deregulatory: health care 
financing laws contributed to the enactment of CON laws, but they have also 
contributed to the curtailment of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine and 
scope of practice restrictions—both of which predated the widespread availability 
of health insurance. 
Part IV argues that expanding health insurance coverage is the best way to 
achieve more fundamental reforms to health care delivery laws. It also argues that 
on balance, having a dynamic regulatory system in health care is normatively 
desirable in health care, and that recognizing this dynamism strengthens the case 
for further expanding coverage. 
The Article concludes by exploring the implications of this dynamism for the 
field of health law as a whole. In contrast to the popular characterization of health 
law as a “patchwork” of divergent laws with little internal coherence,26 I argue that 
uncovering the linkages between health care financing laws and health care delivery 
laws strengthens the case for conceptualizing and approaching health law as a 
distinct field of scholarly inquiry. 
I. HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM LAWS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS 
Health care providers are subject to a voluminous array of federal regulations, 
state laws, and private certifications and standards.27 In this section, I limit myself 
to briefly describing three prominent areas of law governing the delivery of health 
care, and sketching out some of the main criticisms that have been leveled against 
them. These laws have two main things in common: First, they are widely viewed 
as impeding beneficial developments in the delivery of health care by restraining 
innovation, limiting competition, and increasing fragmentation. Second, they are 
perceived as emblematic of health law’s intractable nature, and of its excessive 
deference to health care providers. 
A. Scope of Practice Restrictions 
State occupational licensing laws are the oldest form of laws governing the 
health care delivery system.28 These laws generally provide that it is unlawful to 
practice without a license, lay out certain educational, training, and testing 
requirements, and establish a state licensing board (usually primarily composed of 
 
26. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247, 321 (2003) 
(“The law of health care provision is a chaotic, dysfunctional patchwork.”). 
27. Kieran Walshe & Stephen M. Shortell, Social Regulation of Healthcare Organizations in the 
United States: Developing a Framework for Evaluation, 17 HEALTH SERV. MGMT. RES. 79, 79–80 (2004). 
28. See Lewis A. Grossman, The Origins of American Health Libertarianism, 13 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 76, 88–89 (2013) (describing how some states enacted medical licensing laws before 
the American Revolutionary War). 
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members of the licensed profession) to interpret and enforce the statute.29 In 
addition, licensing laws specify the range of services that health care providers are 
allowed to perform—their so-called “scope of practice”—along with any relevant 
conditions.30 
Licensing laws set quite different scopes of practice for different professions. 
Physicians were the first health care profession to be licensed,31 and are the only 
health care profession whose legal scope of practice is “all-encompassing.”32 
Licensing laws grant the exclusive authority to physicians to perform any service 
that is circumscribed within “the practice of medicine,” which tends to be defined 
quite expansively. For instance, Indiana’s medical practice act defines the practice 
of medicine as including: 
[T]he diagnosis, treatment, correction, or prevention of any disease, 
ailment, defect, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain, or other condition of 
human beings; the suggestion, recommendation, or prescription or 
administration of any form of treatment, without limitation; [and] the 
performing of any kind of surgical operation upon a human being, 
including tattooing.33 
Because the practice of medicine is deemed to be exclusively within the 
purview of physicians, any non-physician who knowingly engages in any of these 
services without a medical license could be deemed to be practicing medicine 
without a license—which in this case is deemed a Class C felony.34 
By contrast, other health care providers, including nurses, physician assistants, 
pharmacists, and dental hygienists, have had to carve out much narrower scopes of 
practice. For example, Indiana defines “practical nursing” to include: 
[C]ontributing to the assessment of the health status of individuals or 
groups; participating in the development and modification of the strategy 
of care; implementing the appropriate aspects of the strategy of care; 
maintaining safe and effective nursing care; and participating in the 
evaluation of responses to the strategy of care.35 
Licensing laws also often require that non-physicians must be supervised by a 
physician in order to perform certain types of tasks. For instance, Indiana allows 
 
29. BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS 
JOST & ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW 6 (2015); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost,  
Introduction—Regulation of the Healthcare Professions, in REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE 
PROFESSIONS 2–5 (Timothy Jost ed., 1992). 
30. Johnson, supra note 9, at 504–09. 
31. Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap Between Can and May in Health-Care Providers’ Scopes of 
Practice: A Primer for Policymakers, 9 YALE J. REG. 301, 306 (2002). 
32. Barbara Safriet, Impediments to Progress in Health Care Workforce Policy: License and Practice 
Laws, 31 INQUIRY 310, 311 (1994). 
33. Johnson, supra note 9, at 502–03 (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 25-22.5-1-1.1 (1978)) 
(emphasis added). 
34. IND. CODE ANN. § 25-22.5-8-2 (1978). 
35. IND. CODE ANN. § 25-23-1-1.3 (1993). 
Second to Printer_Scheffler (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2020  5:31 PM 
738 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:729 
nurse anesthetists to “administer anesthesia if the certified registered nurse 
anesthetist acts under the direction of and in the immediate presence of  
a physician.”36 
Although some scope of practice requirements may be warranted, others place 
excessive limitations on the types of functions performed by non-physician health 
care providers, thereby limiting access to health care—and potentially also raising 
health care costs.37 William Sage and David Hyman describe licensing laws as “the 
most pernicious practice,” and argue that they “discourage existing competitors 
from adopting practices introduced to the market by disruptive innovators” and 
“limit the ability of other licensed health professionals to enter the market, even 
when they have extensive training in diagnosis and treatment.”38 
One illustrative piece of evidence that scope of practice requirements are not 
set at an optimal level is that they vary widely from state to state. For example, 
whereas twenty-two states and the District of Columbia allow Nurse Practitioners 
(NPs) to diagnose patients, initiate and manage certain conditions, and prescribe 
medications independently, twelve states require NPs to have physician oversight 
in order to prescribe, diagnose, and treat patients.39 This variation cannot be 
justified by quality concerns, given that health care education and training standards 
are evidence-based and set nationally.40 
A wide range of institutions, including the Institute of Medicine, the Pew 
Health Professions Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission have argued 
in favor of expanding scope of practice restrictions for health professionals such as 
Advanced Practice Nurses (APNs) (a category that includes Nurse Practitioners, 
Registered Nurse Anesthetists, Nurse-Midwives, and Clinical Nurse Specialists)41 as 
a way to improve access to both primary and acute care without sacrificing quality.42 
 
36. IND. CODE ANN. § 25-23-1-30 (1993). 
37. See, e.g., E. Kathleen Adams & Sara Markowitz, Improving Efficiency in the Health-Care  
System: Removing Anticompetitive Barriers for Advanced Practice Registered Nurses and  
Physician Assistants, THE HAMILTON  7 ( June 2018), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/
removing_anticompetitive_barriers_for_advanced_practice_registered_nurses_a [https://perma.cc/
Y43T-L8ZR]; Morris M. Kleiner, Allison Marier, Kyoung Won Park & Coady Wing, Relaxing 
Occupational Licensing Requirements: Analyzing Wages and Prices for a Medical Service, 59  
J.L. & ECON. 261 (2016); Gabriel Scheffler, Unlocking Access to Health Care: A Federalist Approach to 
Reforming Occupational Licensing, 29 HEALTH MATRIX 293, 310–15 (2019); Tanya Wanchek, Dental 
Hygiene Regulation and Access to Oral Healthcare: Assessing the Variation Across the US States, 48  
BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 706 (2010). 
38. Sage & Hyman, supra note 10, at 734. 
39. Scheffler, supra note 37, at 313–14. 
40. Robert Kocher, Topher Spiro, Emily Oshima Lee, Gabriel Scheffler, Stephen Shortell, 
David Cutler & Ezekiel Emanuel, Doctors Without State Borders: Physicians Practicing Across State Lines, 
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 18, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/02/18/doctors-without-
state-borders-practicing-across-state-lines/ [https://perma.cc/RU64-Z224]. 
41. Nat’l Council of State Boards of Nursing, APRNS in the U.S., NCSBN, https://
www.ncsbn.org/aprn.htm [https://perma.cc/3LNQ-GTYA] ( last visited Jan. 2, 2020). 
42. See, e.g., EDITH RAMIREZ, JULIE BRILL, MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN & JOSHUA WRIGHT, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, POLICY PERSPECTIVES: COMPETITION AND THE REGULATION OF 
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B. The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine 
The general rationale of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine is to 
prevent corporations, as well as individuals who do not possess a medical license, 
from unduly interfering with medical decision-making.43 It entails three specific 
related prohibitions: First, it prevents unlicensed individuals or corporations from 
directly employing physicians. Second, it prevents unlicensed individuals from 
owning or controlling entities that provide health care services. Third, it prohibits 
licensed health care providers from engaging in “fee splitting,” sharing their 
professional earnings with unlicensed individuals or entities.44 
The origins of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine date back to the 
early twentieth century, when the American Medical Association (AMA) was 
growing increasingly concerned by the advent of new business-oriented health care 
delivery models.45 At least two new delivery models began to crop up during that 
period: “contract practice,” in which corporations directly employed physicians to 
provide medical care for their own employees; and “corporate practice,” in which 
corporations employed or contracted with physicians and advertised their services 
to the public.46 Critics of these models, including the AMA, perceived these 
arrangements as threats to the autonomy of the medical profession and to the 
quality of patient care.47 More cynically, physicians opposed these corporate models 
because they threatened to dilute the profits from delivering health care.48 
In response, the AMA introduced new restrictions in its code of professional 
ethics against both contract practice and corporate practice, such as those 
condemning any arrangements under which corporations profit from providing 
medical services.49 In addition, a series of court rulings during the early twentieth 
 
ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSES (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/policy-perspectives-
competition-regulation-advanced-practice-nurses [https://perma.cc/BL66-PQ3X]; INST. OF MED., 
THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING HEALTH 9 (2011); LEONARD  
J. FINOCCHIO ET AL., PEW HEALTH PROFESSIONS COMM’N, REFORMING HEALTH CARE 
WORKFORCE REGULATION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 9–13 (1995). 
43. Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 251–52. 
44. Id. at 244. 
45. CHRISTY FORD CHAPIN, ENSURING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE PUBLIC CREATION OF 
THE CORPORATE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 20 (2015) (“The notion of an overtly competitive, 
commercial health care market dominated by medical corporations terrified physician leaders.”); 
STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 24, at 198–99. 
46. CHAPIN, supra note 45, at 16–20; STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 24, at  
200–06; Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the 
Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445, 456–57 (1987); Adam M. Freiman, The 
Abandonment of the Antiquated Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: Injecting a Dose of Efficiency into 
the Modern Health Care Environment, EMORY L.J. 697, 702 (1998); Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 247–48. 
47. Chase-Lubitz, supra note 46, at 457–58; Freiman, supra note 46, at 702. 
48. STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 24, at 215–16 (“Doctors opposed corporate 
enterprise in medical practice not only because they wanted to preserve their autonomy, but also 
because they wanted to prevent the emergence of any intermediary or third party that might keep for 
itself the profits potentially available in the practice of medicine.”). 
49. Freiman, supra note 46, at 703. 
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century held that corporate practice arrangements violated state medical licensing 
laws.50 Although most medical practice acts do not explicitly prohibit the corporate 
practice of medicine, courts interpreted their requirements that persons have a valid 
license in order to practice medicine as implicitly also prohibiting corporations from 
practicing medicine.51 In some cases, courts justified their interpretations of medical 
practice acts by relying on public policy concerns: for example, worrying that the 
corporate practice of medicine doctrine would impair the doctor-patient 
relationship or commercialize the medical profession.52 
As the practice of medicine has evolved from solo practitioners to large 
integrated health care organizations, the doctrine has ceased to be enforced in most 
states.53 The Supreme Court dealt the AMA a major setback in 1982 when it 
affirmed a Federal Trade Commission order that the AMA’s ethical restraints on 
the corporate practice of medicine violated the Federal Trade Commission Act.54 
In addition, many states have carved out explicit exceptions to the doctrine, 
including for non-profit health care organizations, health care organizations owned 
and managed by licensed physicians, health maintenance organizations (HMOs), 
and medical schools.55 
Nevertheless, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine continues to 
influence how health care organizations are structured and managed today. The 
corporate practice doctrine helps to explain, for example, why Medicare pays 
doctors separately from hospitals, and why hospital staffs in the United States are 
typically members of independent medical staffs, rather than hospital employees.56 
Medical staff committees, rather than the hospital, are generally responsible for 
 
50. See, e.g., Parker v. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs of State of Cal., 216 Cal. 285, 295 (1932) (“The 
letter of the statute authorizes persons only to engage in the practice of dentistry. The underlying theory 
upon which the whole system of dental laws is framed is that the state’s licensee shall possess 
consciousness, learning, skill, and good moral character, all of which are individual characteristics, and 
none of which is an attribute of an artificial entity.”); People v. Painless Parker Dentist, 85 Colo. 304, 
313 (1929) (“It is, however, altogether clear that the inhibition of the statute against the practice of 
dentistry in this state is applicable not only to natural persons, but it applies as well to an artificial person 
or a corporation, because, in the very nature of things, the corporation cannot meet the conditions 
upon which the right to a license depends, and no one, whether an ordinary person or an artificial 
being, is entitled to practice unless, among other requirements, he first secures a license from our state 
board of dental examiners.”). 
51. See Freiman, supra note 46, at 704–4–05; Right of the Corporation to Practice Medicine, 48 
YALE L.J. 346, 347–48 (1938); Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 250–051. 
52. See, e.g., Bartron v. Codington Cty., 68 S.D. 309, 329 (1942) (“Being convinced that the 
practice of the learned professions by a profit corporation tends to the commercialization and 
debasement of those professions, we are of the opinion that such a mode of conducting the practice is 
in contravention of the public interest and is against public policy.”). 
53. Freiman, supra note 46, at 733–40. 
54. Am. Med. Ass’n v. F.T.C., 455 U.S. 676 (1982). 
55. See Freiman, supra note 46, at 706–08. 
56. MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW 
AND ETHICS 1273 (8th ed. 2013). 
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overseeing physicians working in the hospital.57 The prevailing view is that while 
corporate practice prohibitions have been weakened, they remain “‘legal landmines,’ 
remnants of an old and nearly forgotten war, half-buried on a field fast being built 
up with new forms of health care organizations.”58 The fear of tripping these 
landmines hampers innovation by inhibiting health care organizations from 
experimenting with new delivery models.59 
Over the years, many scholars have argued in favor of abolishing the corporate 
practice of medicine doctrine altogether.60 These critics argue that the original 
justifications undergirding the doctrine no longer apply in a world in which the 
delivery of health care is increasingly team-based, and where managed care 
companies exert influence over how care is delivered.61 Rather than serving to 
promote quality, they argue that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine in fact 
degrades the quality of health care by making our health care delivery system more 
fragmented.62 Critics argue that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine 
contributes to this fragmentation by preventing health care organizations from 
exerting control over physicians’ decisions and making it more difficult for health 
care organizations to implement patient-safety initiatives.63 
C. Certificate of Need Laws 
Certificate of Need (CON) laws were ostensibly designed to halt the growth 
in health care spending by requiring hospitals to demonstrate “community need” 
before making new capital investments.64 The theory underlying CON laws, known 
as “Roemer’s Law” (named after health services researcher Milton Roemer), was 
that the construction of new health care facilities itself leads to unnecessary health 
care utilization—a theory succinctly encapsulated by the maxim, “a built bed is a 
 
57. Kristin Madison, Defragmenting Health Care Delivery Through Quality Reporting, in THE 
FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 87 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010). 
58. Arnold J. Rosoff, The Business of Medicine: Problems with the Corporate Practice Doctrine, 17 
CUMB. L. REV. 485 (1986); see also Chase-Lubitz, supra note 46, at 470–71; Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 
253 (“While the doctrine may seem too outdated to be enforced, the statutes and regulations that form 
the doctrine remain in current statutory compilations and, like a sleeping dragon, need only a slight 
stimulus to be set into action.”). 
59. See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 46, at 470; see also Saver, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8, at 
660 (defining health care delivery innovations as “typically alter[ing] the bundle of healthcare services 
offered, how the services are paid for, the process for delivering the services, the medical personnel 
involved, the site of delivery, the use of products and technology, or the organizational structure under 
which care is provided”). 
60. See, e.g., Cebul et al., supra note 11, at 109; Huberfeld, supra note 14; Jost & Emanuel, supra 
note 7, at 2562. 
61. Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 257–60. 
62. Cebul et al., supra note 11. 
63. See Elhauge, Health Care Fragmentation, supra note 7, at 12. 
64. James B. Simpson, Full Circle: The Return of Certificate of Need Regulation of Health Facilities 
to State Control, 19 IND. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (1986). 
Second to Printer_Scheffler (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2020  5:31 PM 
742 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:729 
filled bed.”65 Perhaps counterintuitively, hospitals have historically found CON 
laws appealing, both as a means of erecting barriers to entry for potential 
competitors and as a way of forestalling more dramatic government intervention 
into the health care market.66 
CON laws grew out of previous “health planning” initiatives that involved the 
federal government and state governments in the construction of health care 
facilities.67 The most prominent of these was the Hill-Burton Act of 1946, which 
provided federal grants and loans to states that came up with detailed plans 
identifying their need for new health care facilities and how to address those needs.68 
CON laws emerged during the 1960s and early 1970s, at a time when hospital 
prices were rising at six percent above the general rate of inflation.69 New York 
enacted the first CON law in 1964, and twenty states enacted their own CON laws 
between the 1971 and 1973 legislative sessions.70 In 1974, Congress passed the 
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act (NHPRDA), which 
offered funding to state CON programs that met certain federal standards.71  By 
1980, all fifty states had enacted their own CON legislation.72 
The heyday of CON laws proved to be short-lived, however, and they fell out 
of favor during the 1980s. The advent of managed care and the introduction of 
Medicare’s Prospective Payment System created new incentives for hospitals to 
control health care spending, which in turn appeared to render CON less 
necessary.73 This was accompanied by a growing perception among policymakers 
and researchers that CON laws were failing to reduce health care spending.74 In 
1987, Congress turned against CON laws and repealed the NHPRDA,75 prompting 
 
65. Nicholas Bagley, Medicine As a Public Calling, 114 MICH. L.J. 57, 88 (2015) [hereinafter 
Bagley, Medicine As a Public Calling]. 
66. See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 24, at 398–99 (“The interest of state 
legislatures was plainly cost control. However, the main inspiration for certificate-of-need came from 
the American Hospital Association and its state affiliates. The hospitals, anxious to avoid other forms 
of control, stood to benefit from the limits on competition that this sort of regulation would create.”); 
see also Sallyanne Payton & Rhoda M. Powsner, Regulation Through the Looking Glass: Hospitals, Blue 
Cross, and Certificate-of-Need, 79 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1980) (arguing that these were in fact the driving 
goals behind CON laws, rather than controlling health care spending). 
67. See Bagley, Medicine As a Public Calling, supra note 65, at 85–88. 
68. Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2012). 
69. MARTIN S. FELDSTEIN, THE RISING COST OF HOSPITAL CARE 13 (1971). 
70. Clark C. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by “Certificate of Need”, 59 
VA. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (1973) [hereinafter Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by 
“Certificate of Need”]. 
71. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 
Stat. 2225 (1975). 
72. HALL, BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 56, at 1223. 
73. Bagley, Medicine As a Public Calling, supra note 65, at 89; Christopher J. Conover & Frank 
A. Sloan, Does Removing Certificate-of-Need Regulations Lead to a Surge in Health Care Spending?, 23  
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 455, 456–57 (1998). 
74. Id. 
75. Drug Export Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–660, § 701, 100 Stat. 3743, 3799 (1986). 
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eleven states to repeal their CON laws by 1990.76 In recent years, however, the drive 
to abolish CON laws has slowed,77 and as of February 2019, thirty-four states plus 
the District of Columbia still have CON programs in place.78 
CON laws have also been the subject of widespread criticism.79 The most 
prominent criticism of CON laws is that they are anti-competitive. By restricting 
new entrants into the market, CON laws exacerbate hospital concentration and 
potentially impede innovation.80 The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission have repeatedly criticized CON laws, writing, “on balance, CON 
programs are not successful in containing health care costs, and . . . they pose 
serious anticompetitive risks that usually outweigh their purported economic 
benefits.”81 Others have argued that CON laws are vehicles for politically influential 
hospitals to secure favorable regulatory treatment at the expense of less  
well-connected ones.82 
There are few scholars who are willing to defend CON programs as currently 
constituted.83 Several scholars and policymakers have called for amending CON 
laws or even repealing them outright.84 Others have argued that the real problem 
with CON programs is that they are too limited, as they have no authority to limit 
hospitals’ operating expenses or control hospitals’ prices, and that more expansive 
regulatory programs could more effectively control health care spending.85 
 
*         *         * 
 
76. Matthew D. Mitchell & Christopher Koopman, 40 Years of Certificate-of-Need Laws Across 
America, MERCATUS CTR. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.mercatus.org/publication/40-years-
certificate-need-laws-across-america [https://perma.cc/MJ7B-ZQ96]. 
77.  Emily Whelan Parento, Certificate of Need in the Post-Affordable Care Act Era, 105  
KY. L.J. 201, 212 (2017). 
78. Certificate  of  Need  State  Laws, NAT’L  CONF.  ST.  LEGISLATURES  (Feb.  2016), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/health/con-certificate-of-need-state-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/UVB4-
LMX5]. 
79. See, e.g., HALL, BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 56, at 1225–26 (subsection entitled 
“The Failure of CON Regulation”). 
80. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 85, 96 
(2015). 
81. F.T.C. & U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION 22 
(2004). 
82. See Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by “Certificate of Need,” supra note 
70, at 1186–87 (“Limited investigation suggests further that established community hospitals, major 
medical centers, hospitals associated with religious and similar organizations, and well-entrenched 
proprietaries seem to be capable of receiving special attention for applications which would be rejected 
out of hand if submitted by less well-connected interests.”). 
83. Parento, supra note 77, at 218 (“Among academic scholars, it is rare to find ardent, or even 
lukewarm defenders of CON programs.”). 
84. See, e.g., Jost & Emanuel, supra note 7, at 2562; Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Certificate of Need 
Laws: A Prescription for Higher Costs, 30 ANTITRUST 50, 53 (2015) (“[T]here has been a lengthy, 
bipartisan consensus at the FTC that state CON laws should be repealed.”); William M. Sage, Getting 
the Product Right: How Competition Policy Can Improve Health Care Markets, 33 HEALTH AFFS. 1076, 
1080 (2014) (calling for reducing or removing CON laws, and other barriers to market entry). 
85. HALL, BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 56, at 1225. 
Second to Printer_Scheffler (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2020  5:31 PM 
744 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:729 
 
In sum, the predominant view of these three types of laws—scope of practice 
restrictions, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, and CON laws—is that 
they represent barriers to improving the health care delivery system. In addition, 
they are perceived as difficult to change, largely because they are supported by 
interest groups who benefit from the status quo. Although this view has some truth 
to it, I show in Parts II and III that this “law-as-barrier perspective” overlooks a 
central feature of health law: the impact of health care financing laws on the health 
care delivery system. 
II. PATHWAYS OF INFLUENCE 
This Section explores the relationship between health care financing laws and 
health care delivery laws in two stages. First, it outlines three different channels 
through which health care financing laws serve to increase the demand for health 
care. Second, it explains why increasing the demand for health care in turn affects 
health care delivery laws. Drawing on work by Kenneth Arrow and John Kingdon, 
it shows that the connection between health insurance and health care delivery laws 
can be viewed as one manifestation of a larger relationship between market failures 
and nonmarket institutions in health care. 
A. Health Care Financing Laws and the Demand for Health Care 
Health care financing laws serve to transform health care delivery laws 
through increasing the demand for health care. Historically, this has transpired 
through three main channels: First, expanding health insurance increases patients’ 
access to care and causes patients to utilize more health care services. Second, 
financing laws have encouraged providers to deliver more health care services by 
increasing the amount of money in the health care system and paying providers 
based on the amount of services they provide (known as “fee-for-service” 
reimbursement). Third, over time, expanding health insurance also leads hospitals 
and medical centers to adopt new expensive new medical technologies, and sends a 
signal to technology developers to create more such technologies. This Section 
briefly discusses each of these mechanisms, as well as the benefits and concerns 
associated with them. 
1. Increasing Patients’ Access to Health Care 
The first—and most obvious—way that expanding health insurance serves to 
increase the demand for health care is through increasing patients’ access to health 
care services.86 Improving access to health care is one of the central purposes of 
 
86. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 4 (1993) (defining 
health care access as having “the timely use of personal health services to achieve the best possible health 
outcomes”). 
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health insurance—and one of the central goals of health care reform.87 By lowering 
the cost that individuals face when obtaining health care, health insurance enables 
patients to access health care that they value but would not otherwise be able  
to afford.88 
A large body of empirical research confirms that expanding health insurance 
coverage improves access to health care and causes patients to use more health care 
services.89 The two most well-known studies on the effects of health insurance are 
both randomized controlled trials: the RAND Health Insurance Experiment and 
the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment. The RAND Experiment, conducted in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, randomly assigned participants to different health 
insurance plans with different levels of cost-sharing (i.e., these plans covered 
different percentages of individuals’ total health care costs), and found that those 
individuals enrolled in plans with lower cost-sharing had higher levels of health care 
utilization.90 More recently, in 2008, the state of Oregon randomly allocated 
Medicaid coverage to recipients via a lottery, allowing researchers to compare 
individuals who received Medicaid coverage to those with no health insurance.91 
Follow-up analyses found that those recipients who gained Medicaid coverage had 
more hospital admissions, emergency department visits, and outpatient visits, and 
ordered more prescription drugs.92 
 
87. See, e.g., Timothy Jost, Affordability: The Most Urgent Health Reform Issue for Ordinary 
Americans, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20160229.053330/full/ [https://perma.cc/W2NU-FK4G?type=image] (“A primary goal of the 
ACA was to improve access to health care.”); Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform: What’s Insurance Got 
to Do with It? Recognizing Health Insurance As a Separate Species of Insurance, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 436, 
439 (2010) (“A key goal of health reform is to give everyone access to health care. Health insurance is 
simply a means to that larger end: appropriate, affordable health care regardless of employment, 
residence, health status, age or other factors that currently inhibit access.”); see also Allison K. Hoffman, 
Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, 159 U. PENN L. REV. 1873, 1888 (2011) (calling the “Health Promotion” theory of health insurance 
as the theory “that the primary goal of health insurance is to mitigate the risk of harms to health”). 
88. John A. Nyman, American Health Policy: Cracks in the Foundation, 32 J. HEALTH  
POL. POL’Y & L. 759, 768 (2007) [hereinafter Nyman, American Health Policy: Cracks in the Foundation]. 
89. See Benjamin D. Sommers, Atul A. Gawande & Katherine Baicker, Health Insurance 
Coverage and Health—What the Recent Evidence Tells Us, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 586, 588 (2017) 
(describing several studies which find that health insurance expansions increase health care utilization). 
90. See generally JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH 
INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (1993). 
91. In this respect, it differed from the RAND Experiment, which compared individuals who 
all had health insurance but with different levels of cost-sharing. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, Moral 
Hazard in Health Insurance: What We Know and How We Know It, 16 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 957,  
963–64 (2018), https://economics.mit.edu/files/14545 [https://perma.cc/M4A5-VR3F]. 
92. See AMY FINKELSTEIN, MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE 21 (2015) [hereinafter 
FINKELSTEIN, MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE]; Amy Finkelstein et al., The Oregon Health 
Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year, 127  
Q.J. ECON. 1057 (2012)Amy Finkelstein et al., Effect of Medicaid Coverage on ED Use — Further 
Evidence from Oregon’s Experiment, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1505 (2016). 
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There is also a growing body of empirical evidence that expanding health 
insurance improves health outcomes by increasing access to health care. In 2017, 
Benjamin Sommers, Atul Gawande, and Katherine Baicker conducted a thorough 
review of the empirical literature on the effects of health insurance, and concluded 
that “coverage expansions significantly increase patients’ access to care and use of 
preventive care, primary care, chronic illness treatment, medications, and surgery,” 
and that “some of these changes will ultimately help tens of thousands of people 
live longer lives.”93 More recent studies have continued to bolster the link between 
health insurance expansions and improved health outcomes.94 
Despite the benefits of health insurance coverage, economists and 
policymakers have historically been quite concerned that health insurance leads to 
excess demand for health care.95 The theory underlying this concern, referred to as 
moral hazard, is that by lowering the price of health care, insurance causes people to 
consume health care services that they do not value sufficiently to justify the costs 
of providing that care.96 
Concerns about moral hazard have led a number of health economists over 
the years to theorize that health insurance is inefficient.97 Mark Pauly first 
articulated this possibility in an influential 1968 essay, venturing that the total 
benefits from health insurance in terms of reducing financial risk could potentially 
be smaller than its costs in terms of causing excess utilization and health care 
spending.98 In a 1973 article, Martin Feldstein went further, concluding—at a time 
 
93. Sommers, Gawande & Baicker, supra note 89, at 590–91. 
94. See, e.g., Sameed Ahmed M. Khatana et al., Association of Medicaid Expansion with 
Cardiovascular Mortality, 4 JAMA CARDIOLOGY 671 (2019) (finding that Medicaid expansion was 
associated with lower cardiovascular mortality). 
95. See ECONOMIC RECORD, supra note 19, at 27 n.13 (“While many non-economists consider 
it a self-evidently good thing when expanded insurance coverage increases use of health care, a  
long-standing strand of economic research emphasizes the possibility that health insurance will drive 
overconsumption of health care by insulating enrollees from the cost of services, a phenomenon 
referred to as ‘moral hazard.’”) (citation omitted). 
96. See Joseph P. Newhouse, Medical Care Costs: How Much Welfare Loss?, 6  
J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 15 (1992) (“[T]he dominant view of health insurance in the economics literature, at 
least in the American literature, is that ‘too much’ health insurance leads consumers to demand ‘too 
much’ medical care at each point in time, which is reasonably well established, as well as ‘too much’ 
technological change, which is less well established.”). One potential alternative form of moral hazard, 
which is referred to as ex ante moral hazard (as opposed to the predominant notion of moral hazard, 
which is sometimes called ex post moral hazard), is the notion that having health insurance causes 
individuals to take less good care of their health. Yet there is little empirical evidence substantiating this 
effect. See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 284 (1996) (“There is 
no strong evidence that insurance reduces the level of care individuals take to prevent bodily injury.”); 
Einav & Finkelstein, supra note 91, at 963. 
97. Nyman, American Health Policy: Cracks in the Foundation, supra note 88, at 765. 
98. Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AMER. ECON. REV. 531, 535 
(1968); see also JOHN A. NYMAN, THE THEORY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE 9 (2003) 
[hereinafter NYMAN, THE THEORY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE] (referring to Pauly’s 
article as perhaps “the single most influential article in the health economics literature”). 
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when over 24 million Americans were uninsured99—that “American families are in 
general overinsured against health expenses,” and that “the current excess use of 
health insurance produces a very substantial welfare loss.”100 
More recently, a number of scholars—most prominently, John Nyman—have 
challenged this account. Nyman argues that while health insurance may cause some 
amount of excess utilization, most moral hazard is actually efficient because it 
enables patients to access health care that they value highly but would not otherwise 
be able to access, due to financial constraints.101 Under this view, the increased 
utilization caused by obtaining health insurance “is not a distortion of the system; it 
is just getting rid of the problem of the liquidity constraints that people face.”102 
Nyman refers to this as “efficient moral hazard,”103 while Jonathan Gruber calls it 
“an income or liquidity effect.”104 
Nevertheless, concerns about moral hazard have proven quite influential over 
the years.105 The theory of moral hazard has undergirded many health insurance 
“innovations” in recent decades, including the proliferation of “cost-sharing” in 
health insurance plans (in the form of deductibles, co-pays, co-insurance, etc.), the 
advent of the “managed care” movement, and the introduction of health  
savings accounts.106 
2. Affecting Providers’ Treatment Behavior 
The second way that expanding health insurance increases the demand for 
health care is through changing the ways that providers deliver care. For most of 
U.S. history, physicians operated as solo practitioners and practiced on a small scale 
“because there were no substantial economies to be achieved in a large scale 
 
99. Robin A. Cohen et. al., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Health Insurance Coverage 
Trends, 1959-2007: Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, NAT’L HEALTH  
STAT. REPORTS (2009). 
100. Martin S. Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. POL. ECON. 251, 
251, 275 (1973). 
101. See generally John A. Nyman, The Economics of Moral Hazard Revisited, 18 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 811 (1999); John A. Nyman, The Value of Health Insurance: The Access Motive, 18 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 141 (1999). 
102. Jonathan Gruber, Commentary, in MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE 50 (2015). 
103. NYMAN, THE THEORY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 98, at 103. 
104. Gruber, supra note 102, at 49. 
105. See Malcolm Gladwell, The Moral-Hazard Myth, NEW YORKER (Aug. 29, 2005), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/08/29/the-moral-hazard-myth [https://perma.cc/C462-
2JZE] (“[M]oral hazard has profoundly shaped the way think tanks formulate policy and the way 
experts argue and the way health insurers structure their plans and the way legislation and regulations 
have been written.”). 
106. Nyman, American Health Policy: Cracks in the Foundation, supra note 88, at 760. 
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practice.”107 U.S. hospitals and health care facilities, which originated as religious or 
charitable institutions, had long been organized as non-profit entities.108 
Yet with first the growth of employer-sponsored health insurance and then 
the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, a wave of money flooded the health care 
system, precipitating a surge of new entrepreneurial ventures. Clark Havighurst 
describes how Medicare in particular transformed the culture of health care: 
Perhaps Medicare’s most significant side effect was to make the health care 
sector an arena for profit-seeking activity more than ever before. For the 
first time, hospitals and physicians could expect to be paid well for much 
of the care they had previously provided for less. They also saw huge 
increases in demand for even the costliest of their services. Entrepreneurs 
suddenly saw new opportunities in health care, and physicians saw 
opportunities to become entrepreneurs themselves.109 
Between 1976 and 1982, the number of hospitals owned or managed by  
for-profit organizations nearly doubled, even while the overall number of hospitals 
decreased.110 In 1980, Arnold Relman, the then-editor of the New England Journal 
of Medicine, published an article in the Journal decrying “the New Medical-Industrial 
Complex,” and warning that physicians’ growing financial entanglements in the 
health care system risked creating conflicts of interest and preventing them from 
curbing over-utilization.111 
These effects were compounded by the fact that Medicare employed the 
traditional fee-for-service reimbursement model. In the decades following the 
enactment of Medicare, fee-for-service reimbursement has been widely blamed for 
encouraging providers to deliver those services that are most profitable, rather than 
those which are most beneficial for patients, and for driving up overall health care 
spending.112 Of course, many non-financial factors affect providers’ treatment 
behavior as well, such as their education and training, potential legal liability, and 
uncertainty about the proper course of treatment.113 Nevertheless, a substantial 
 
107. Victor R. Fuchs, Can the Traditional Practice of Medicine Survive?, 125 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 154, 155 (1970). 
108. Bradford H. Gray, An Introduction to the New Health Care for Profit, in THE NEW HEALTH 
CARE FOR PROFIT: DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 1, 7 (Bradford  
H. Gray ed., 1983). 
109. Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law, supra note 25, at 89; see also ROBERT  
I. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY, CONFRONTATION, AND 
COMPROMISE 173 (2007) (“The driving force behind the commercial transformation of American 
health care was the development of insurance.”). 
110. Gray, supra note 108, at 2. 
111. Arnold S. Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 963 (1980). 
112. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, The Perfect Storm of Overutilization, 299 JAMA 
2789, 2790 (2008). This phenomenon is often referred to as physician-induced demand or supplier-induced 
demand. See generally EM Johnson, Physician-Induced Demand, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HEALTH 
ECONOMICS 77 (Anthony J. Culyer ed., 2014). Jonathan Gruber refers to it as provider-side moral hazard. 
Gruber, supra note 102, at 47–49. 
113. See Lisa Rosenbaum, The Less-Is-More Crusade—Are We Overmedicalizing or 
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body of empirical research finds that financial incentives do affect providers’ 
treatment decisions.114 For instance, one recent study found that on average, a two 
percent increase in physician payment rates led to a three percent increase in the 
provision of health care services.115 
In an effort to curb excess demand, the ACA included several initiatives 
designed to shift health insurance away from fee-for-service reimbursement and 
toward reimbursing providers based on the extent to which they improve patients’ 
health (known as “value-based health care”).116 The law promoted a variety of new 
payment models such as Accountable Care Organizations, which were explicitly 
designed to “base payments on the results health care organizations and health care 
professionals achieve for all of their patients’ care.”117 Nevertheless, for the time 
being at least, fee-for-service remains the dominant provider payment method in 
the United States.118 
3. Encouraging the Development and Adoption of Technology 
Finally, expanding health insurance coverage increases demand by changing 
the course of technological development in medicine.119 The growth of medical 
technology is thought to be one of the primary drivers of health care spending.120 
Economists have argued that over time, expanding health insurance encourages 
hospitals and medical centers to adopt expensive new technologies, and even 
further on, incentivizes innovators to develop more such technologies in the first 
place.121 For instance, there is evidence the enactment of Medicare led to the 
adoption of open-heart surgery facilities and cardiac intensive care units.122 Once 
again, fee-for-service reimbursement compounds these incentives by encouraging 
 
Oversimplifying?, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2392, 2394 (2017); Lisa S. Rotenstein & Anupam B. Jena,  
It’s Time to Rethink the Anatomy of  Behavior, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 22, 2018), https://
www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180618.721948/full/ [https://perma.cc/U3PP-WB92]. 
114. See Johnson, supra note 112 (summarizing the empirical evidence). 
115. See Jeffrey Clemens & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Do Physicians’ Financial Incentives Affect Medical 
Treatment and Patient Health, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1320 (2014). 
116. See ECONOMIC RECORD, supra note 19, at 47–56. 
117. Barack Obama, United States Health Care Reform: Progress to Date and Next Steps, 316 
JAMA 525, 528 (2016). 
118. Samuel H. Zuvekas & Joel W. Cohen, Fee-For-Service, While Much Maligned, Remains the 
Dominant Payment Method for Physician Visits, 35 HEALTH AFF. 411, 411 (2016). 
119. See, e.g., FINKELSTEIN, MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 92, at 36-40. 
120. See Newhouse, supra note 96. 
121. Sherry A. Glied, Health Insurance and Market Failure Since Arrow, in UNCERTAIN  
TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 103, 107 (Peter  
J. Hammer et al. eds., 2003). 
122. Amy Finkelstein, The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance: Evidence from the Introduction 
of Medicare, 122 Q.J. ECON. 1, 26–29 (2007) [hereinafter Finkelstein, The Aggregate Effects of  
Health Insurance]. 
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the adoption and development of costly new technologies, even if their benefits are 
uncertain or marginal.123 
Taking these long-term technological effects on the health care system into 
account implies that health insurance has a much larger impact on the demand for 
health care than its immediate incentive effects on patients and providers alone 
would suggest.124 According to one estimate that tries to factor in these 
technological effects, the spread of insurance between 1950 and 1990 can explain 
roughly half of the increase in health care spending during this time.125 
The story of technological development in medicine is not all negative. The 
U.S. health insurance system has likely led to the development of some valuable 
technologies, and likely also means that Americans are often the first ones to be 
able to take advantage of new medical technologies.126 On the whole, however, 
many economists believe that the way in which the United States’ insurance system 
interacts with technology is inefficient, in that it causes excess expenditures on 
unproductive medical technologies with uncertain benefits.127 
B. Arrow’s “Feedback Loop” and Agenda-Setting 
Through each of the channels described above, health insurance serves to 
increase the demand for health care. As I will show in Part III, concerns about 
health insurance leading to excess demand have in turn historically led regulators to 
experiment with changes to delivery system regulations in order to stem any adverse 
consequences on health care access, health care costs, and health care quality. 
Kenneth Arrow appeared to foreshadow this relationship among health 
insurance, increased demand for health care, and health care delivery laws, in his 
classic 1963 article, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. The central 
thesis of his article was that many of the distinctive nonmarket institutions present 
in the health care system (such as medical licensing, physician codes of ethics, etc.) 
 
123. Nicholas Bagley, Amitabh Chandra & Austin Frakt, Correcting Signals for Innovation in 
Health Care, HAMILTON PROJECT 1, 10 (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/
correcting_signals_for_innovation_in_health_care [https://perma.cc/BG44-DTSN] (“Perhaps the 
primary explanation for high rates of inefficient use of medical technology is widespread use of 
reimbursement methods that encourage a high volume of care without regard to its value.”). The 
interactions between our health insurance system and the development and adoption of medical 
technology are sometimes referred to as “dynamic moral hazard.” See, e.g., Peter Zweifel & Willard  
G. Manning, Moral Hazard and Consumer Incentives in Health Care, in 1A THE HANDBOOK OF 
HEALTH ECONOMICS 409, 413 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000). 
124. See Finkelstein, The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance, supra note 122, at 3 (estimating 
that the introduction of Medicare is over six times what the RAND estimates would have predicted 
based solely on changing patients’ incentives). 
125. Id. 
126. Amitabh Chandra & Jonathan Skinner, Technology Growth and Expenditure Growth in 
Health Care, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 645, 647 (2012). 
127. Katherine Baicker, Amitabh Chandra & Jonathan S. Skinner, Saving Money or Just Saving 
Lives? Improving the Productivity of US Health Care Spending, 4 ANN. REV. ECON. 33, 46 (2012). 
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arose in response to market failures, and in particular, to information asymmetries, 
which he defined as “inequalities of information between the insurer on one hand 
and the physician and patient on the other.”128 
The relationship between health insurance and health care delivery laws can 
be understood as part of this general relationship between market failures and 
nonmarket institutions. Arrow theorized that the market will undersupply health 
insurance on its own due to information asymmetries between insurers and 
individuals, and thus advocated the government should step in to provide health 
insurance.129 Yet Arrow presciently observed that “widespread medical insurance 
increases the demand for medical care,”130 which in turn tends to lead to “market 
forces . . . [being] replaced by direct institutional control.”131 Although it is unclear 
exactly what Arrow had in mind by “direct institutional control,” that description 
would seem to encompass health care delivery laws, such as Certificate of  
Need restrictions.132 
In sum, under Arrow’s account, the relationship between health care financing 
laws and health care delivery laws is one manifestation of a broader feedback loop 
in health care between market failures and government responses. The market’s 
failure to provide health insurance to the public has necessitated  
government-provided health insurance, which has increased the demand for health 
care, which in turn has created pressure for the government to change delivery  
system regulations.133 
Why does increased demand for health care generate political pressure for 
reforming delivery system laws? The account that follows suggests two main 
reasons: First, policymakers have historically (and in some cases, justifiably) been 
 
128. Kenneth J. Arrow, Reflections on the Reflections, in UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW 
AND THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 321, 321 (Peter J. Hammer et al. eds., 2003) 
[hereinafter Arrow, Reflections on the Reflections]. 
129. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, supra note 23, at 961. 
130. Id. at 961. 
131. Id. at 962. 
132. Arrow made at least one other oblique reference to “direct controls” in a 2002 essay 
reflecting on his original 1963 article and the responses it generated. See Arrow, Reflections on the 
Reflections, supra note 128, at 321–22 (“The role of moral hazard in medical insurance arises from 
inequalities of information between the insurer on one hand and the physician and patient on the other. 
By itself, this phenomenon was well known in other kinds of insurance (where the term moral hazard 
arose) and was met by various devices, such as deductibles and ceilings. Direct controls came later, as I 
conjectured.”). 
133. Others have described this dynamic in similar terms. See Glied, supra note 121, at 107 
(“[T]he interplay between market failures, wherever they originate, and institutions that Arrow 
described in 1963 continues now. Just as Arrow argued in 1963, each of these market failures has 
generated its own set of institutional responses, and, in turn, these institutional responses have led to 
further market failures.”); Michael Chernew, General Equilibrium and Marketability in the Health Care 
Industry, in UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF HEALTH 
CARE 37, 37–38 (Peter J. Hammer et al. eds., 2003) (“The central thesis of this essay is that market and 
nonmarket institutions have a symbiotic relationship, with nonmarket institutions serving to improve 
resource allocation in areas where markets fail or do not exist.”). 
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concerned that—if left unaddressed—this increased demand will negate the 
effectiveness of expanding health insurance in improving access to care, or, 
exacerbate costs and quality problems. This account aligns with political scientist 
John Kingdon’s emphasis on the role that “problem recognition”—or “[h]ow 
people define something as a problem”—plays in determining which issues rise to 
the top of policymakers’ agendas.134 Second, to the extent that health insurance 
expansions are publicly financed, they render the cost of health care more visible 
and urgent since it is now reflected in the government’s budget, rather than just in 
individuals’ own balance sheets. This is again supported by the work of Kingdon, 
who highlights budgetary considerations as playing an especially important role in 
pushing health care issues to the top of the policymaking agenda.135 
There are a couple distinctions between the account offered in this Article and 
Arrow’s. First, Arrow does not explicitly acknowledge the notion of a dynamic 
regulatory system. To the contrary, he later emphasized the path dependence of the 
health care delivery laws, suggesting that he may have viewed the relationship 
between insurance expansions and subsequent reforms as more of a one-off  
cause-and-effect relationship.136 By contrast, I find that health insurance expansions 
have created a system in which delivery system regulations are continually adjusting 
and evolving. 
Second, whereas Arrow theorized that the nonmarket institutions present in 
health care “actually improved efficiency,”137 I do not assume that this is always the 
case. For instance, I show how Medicare and Medicaid contributed to the enactment 
of CON laws, which have been widely criticized in retrospect. Nevertheless, I argue 
that the overall dynamism of health law—while not always leading to optimal 
outcomes in every individual case—is on the whole normatively desirable. 
 
134. KINGDON, supra note 24, at 90, 198. 
135.  Id. at 105–07. 
136. See Arrow, Reflections on the Reflections, supra note 128, at 326 (“One type of explanation is 
that history matters. At a formal level, the system is governed by dynamic relations, which have some 
degree of instability, so that small variations can produce large and long-lasting deviations in outcome 
after a while. The equations for predicting weather seem to be of this kind. One decision creates 
enduring structures that are costly to change.”). 
137. Id. at 323; see also Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, supra note 
23, at 947 (“The doctrine that society will seek to achieve optimality by non-market means if it cannot 
achieve them in the market is not novel. Certainly, the government, at least in its economic activities, is 
usually implicitly or explicitly held to function as the agency which substitutes for the market’s failure. 
I am arguing here that in some circumstances other social institutions will step into the optimality gap, 
and that the medical-care industry, with its variety of special institutions, some ancient, some modern, 
exemplifies this tendency.”); Chernew, supra note 133, at 39 (“In the absence of this rich set of markets, 
Arrow contended that nonmarket institutions would develop so that resource allocation would come 
closer to the competitive ideal than would otherwise occur if only the incomplete set of markets were 
relied upon.”). 
Second to Printer_Scheffler (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2020  5:31 PM 
2020] THE DYNAMISM OF HEALTH LAW 753 
III. HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE EVOLUTION OF HEALTH CARE  
DELIVERY LAWS 
This Section shows how the two most important health care financing laws in 
U.S. history—the 1965 Medicare/Medicaid legislation and the 2010 Affordable 
Care Act—influenced the three major areas of delivery system law outlined above 
by increasing the demand for health care. This increased demand has tended to 
exacerbate preexisting concerns about the “iron triangle” objectives of health care 
policy: ensuring access, reducing costs, and improving quality.138 These concerns in 
turn have generated political pressure to reform health care delivery system laws. 
Importantly, these effects have not consistently been pro-regulatory or 
deregulatory. Medicare and Medicaid contributed to the enactment of Certificate of 
Need laws, but these programs (and to a lesser extent, the ACA) also contributed 
to the curtailment of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine and scope of 
practice restrictions. 
This Section focuses primarily on the impacts of Medicare and Medicaid, but 
I highlight the ACA’s effects as well where relevant. Because the ACA’s main 
coverage provisions only went into effect in 2014 and because these regulatory 
changes play out slowly over many years, it seems likely that the ACA’s impacts will 
grow over time. However, recent policy changes that have undermined the ACA’s 
coverage expansion may make this less likely.139 
A. Physician Shortages and the Curtailment of Scope of Practice Laws 
The first way in which health insurance expansions have influenced health 
care delivery laws is through accentuating concerns about the supply of health care 
providers being insufficient to meet the rising demand for health care. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, as more physicians began to leave general practice and enter specialized 
medical fields, there was a growing perception of a shortage of primary  
care physicians.140 
During these decades, the government issued a series of reports warning that 
“the health of American citizens was threatened by a physician shortage,” 
compounded by a shortage of other health professionals.141 These reports called for 
an expansion in medical education, and recommended that physicians delegate more 
 
138. DAVID CUTLER, THE QUALITY CURE 1–2 (2014); see generally WILLIAM KISSICK, 
MEDICINE’S DILEMMAS: INFINITE NEEDS VERSUS FINITE RESOURCES (1994) (introducing the 
concept of the iron triangle and theorizing that these three objectives will inevitably be in tension with 
one another). 
139. Margot Sanger-Katz, After Falling Under Obama, America’s Uninsured Rate Looks to Be 
Rising, N.Y. TIMES UPSHOT ( Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/23/upshot/rate-of-
americans-without-health-insurance-rising.html [https://perma.cc/KHG3-4CAR]. 
140. JULIE FAIRMAN, MAKING ROOM IN THE CLINIC: NURSE PRACTITIONERS AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF MODERN HEALTH CARE 16 (2008) [hereinafter FAIRMAN, MAKING ROOM IN  
THE CLINIC]. 
141. Id.; see also STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 24, at 364. 
Second to Printer_Scheffler (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2020  5:31 PM 
754 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:729 
responsibilities to other health professions.142 In doing so, they “provided an 
unintended opening and an avenue for other health professionals to broaden their 
roles by taking on functions traditionally considered within the realm  
of medicine.”143 
The establishment of Medicaid and Medicare in 1965, and the accompanying 
prospect of millions of elderly and poor individuals suddenly obtaining health 
insurance and flooding health care facilities, lent greater urgency to these concerns. 
In a 1966 interview with The New York Times, the president of the New York 
Hospital-Cornell Medical Center blamed Congress for “enact[ing] legislation which 
promises the American people health care without first anticipating the number of 
doctors, nurses, hospital beds and other medical resources needed to accomplish 
it,” calling the decision to expand health insurance without first expanding the 
supply of health care providers “another example of the eccentric planning peculiar 
to this country.”144 During this period, newspapers ran numerous other stories 
deeming the shortage of health care providers a “crisis,” and focusing in particular 
on Medicare’s role in increasing the demand for health care.145 
Congress too was concerned that the enactment of Medicare would lead to a 
shortage of providers. Shortly after the implementation of Medicare, the legal 
counsel of one hospital in Nebraska warned the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare that with recent enactment of Medicare, “this Nation is faced 
with the most critical shortage of nurses in its history.”146 These concerns persisted 
in the years that followed, as signs of a shortage materialized. For instance, in 1971, 
133 counties did not have an active physician, up from 98 counties in 1963.147 
In response to these concerns, Congress passed the Allied Health Professions 
Personnel Training Act, which provided additional funding and training for the 
health care professions.148 The legislative history of the Act is replete with 
expressions of concern that Medicare created a shortage of health care providers. 
For example, in a speech on the House floor in support the Act, one member of 
Congress underscored the imperative of training additional non-physician providers 
to meet the rising demand stemming from Medicare: 
 
142. FAIRMAN, MAKING ROOM IN THE CLINIC, supra note 139, at 17. 
143. Id. 
144. Medicare Hobbled by Shortages, Says New York Hospital Chief, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1966,  
at 13. 
145. See, e.g., More Physicians Needed, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 1966, at 42; David Lawrence, 
Medicare May Bring on Further Problems, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1965, at J6; Richard D. Lyons, Doctor Shortage 
Nearing a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1967, at 1; Cabell Phillips, Need for Nurses Called Critical,  
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1966, at 22; Harry Nelson, New Medical Programs Push Doctor Shortage to Crisis Point, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 5, 1965, § 7, at 1. 
146. Health Professions Personnel, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Emp’t and Manpower of the 
Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 89th Cong. 326 (1966) (statement of Richard H. Hansen, Legal 
Counsel, St. Elizabeth Hospital). 
147. FAIRMAN, MAKING ROOM IN THE CLINIC, supra note 140, at 36. 
148. Allied Health Professions Training Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-751, 80 Stat. 1222 (1966). 
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As the House knows, I have long been a strong advocate of a health 
program for the aged, but I would be the first to admit that the legislation 
will be of little value unless we have sufficient facilities and personnel to 
make health care available to all who need it. This is another reason why I 
feel it is important that we not delay in establishing a program to train 
students in the allied health professions. These paramedical people can take 
a tremendous load off our doctors, dentists, and professional nurses and 
enable them to treat more people more quickly and more effectively.149 
These concerns in turn contributed to states’ scaling back scope of practice 
restrictions on non-physician providers. In 1971, a special committee appointed by 
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare called for broadening nurses’ roles 
in health care delivery, citing the “increasing demand” for health care services.150 
Others called for expanding the roles of physician assistants as well.151 That same 
year, Idaho became the first state to authorize NPs to diagnose patients and 
prescribe medications, subject to regulations promulgated by the medicine and 
nursing boards.152 Thirty other states shortly followed suit.153 
Over time, Richard Cooper and Linda Aiken write, “[l]icensure . . . shifted 
from restricting entry to empowering a diverse array of NPCS [non-physician 
clinicians] whose scope of practice overlaps that of physicians.”154 They attribute 
this trend primarily to concerns about a physician shortage.155 Similarly, Ruth Elder 
and Bonnie Bullough write, “[t]he major impetus behind the development of NPs 
was a perceived shortage of physicians.”156 
 
149. 112 CONG. REC. 13,989 (1966). 
150. U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND 
WELFARE, EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF NURSING PRACTICE: A REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S 
COMMITTEE TO STUDY EXTENDED ROLES FOR NURSES 4 (1971). 
151. T. Elaine Adamson, Critical Issues in the Use of Physician Associates and Assistants, 61  
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1765, 1765 (1971) (“The demand for medical services has been increasing rapidly, 
especially since the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid . . . . Productivity of the medical care system 
can be augmented . . . by the transfer of some of the physician’s tasks to physician associates and 
physician assistants.”). 
152. IDAHO CODE § 54-1413(e) (1971) (repealed by 1977 Idaho Sess. Laws 279); Barbara  
J. Safriet, Health Care Dollars and Regulatory Sense: The Role of Advanced Practice Nursing, 9 YALE  
J. ON REG. 417, 445 (1992) [hereinafter Safriet, Health Care Dollars and the Regulatory Sense]. 
153. Bonnie Bullough, The Law and the Expanding Nursing Role, 66 AJPH 249, 251 (1976) 
[hereinafter Bullugh, The Law and the Expanding Nursing Role] (listing “30 states which have enacted 
amendments to their nurse practice acts in the last five years to facilitate nurses taking on diagnostic 
and treatment functions” and describing these developments as “moving so fast they have taken on an 
almost revolutionary character”). 
154. Richard A. Cooper & Linda H. Aiken, Human Inputs: The Health Care Workforce and 
Medical Markets, in UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF 
HEALTH CARE 71, 72 (Peter J. Hammer et al. eds., 2003). 
155. Id. at 74 (“[T]he most powerful stimulus to their expansion was the perceived shortage of 
primary care physicians and the ability of NPCs not only to provide the needed services, but also to 
enhance the productivity of clinical teams.”). 
156. Ruth G. Elder & Bonnie Bullough, Nurse Practitioners and Clinical Nurse Specialists: Are 
the Roles Merging?, 4 CLINICAL NURSE SPECIALIST 78, 79 (1990). But see Diane O. McGivern, 
Second to Printer_Scheffler (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2020  5:31 PM 
756 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:729 
Of course, concerns about physician shortages predated Medicare and 
Medicaid, and other factors played a role in the expansion of non-physician 
providers as well, including organized activism by nurses and broader social 
movements.157 Frances Porcher has argued that there was in fact no real shortage 
of primary care providers, but rather that “[s]avvy nursing leaders exploited the 
opportunity presented by the perception of a shortage of primary care to advance their 
agenda to create expanded roles for nurses.”158 
Nevertheless, the prospect of a looming physician shortage caused by millions 
of people gaining health insurance played a contributing role in relaxing restrictions 
on non-physician providers.159 Julie Fairman noted that “[t]he impact of federal 
 
Environmental Factors Shaping Advanced Practice, in NURSE PRACTITIONERS: THE EVOLUTION AND 
FUTURE OF ADVANCED PRACTICE 161, 161–62 (Eileen M. Sullivan-Marx et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010) 
(“The drive behind advanced-practice role development and expansion is frequently presented in the 
simplest terms. Most contemporary literature notes that the NP role arose solely to compensate for the 
lack of physician services, giving credence to the view of NPs as substitutes or extenders, as opposed 
to providers of both necessary and unique services. This linear connection between physician supply 
and development of advanced practice from nursing . . . diminishes the powerful nursing dialogue that 
guided NP role development and the strong holistic perspective that distinguishes NPs’ contribution 
from medicine.”). 
157. See, e.g., FAIRMAN, MAKING ROOM IN THE CLINIC, supra note 140, at 2–3; Julie  
A. Fairman, Historic and Historical Opportunities: Nurse Practitioners and the Opportunities of Health 
Reform, in NURSE PRACTITIONERS: THE EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF ADVANCED PRACTICE 3, 6–7 
(Eileen M. Sullivan-Marx et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010); Bullough, The Law and the Expanding Nursing Role, 
supra note 153, at 249 (“Various factors have contributed to the need for this role expansion, including 
the shortage of primary care physicians created by the shift away from primary to a specialty orientation 
in medicine, the growing consumer demand for adequate health care, and, in some cases, such as the 
coronary and intensive care units, the improved technology which has afforded new opportunities for 
skilled nurses to save the lives of a significant number of patients.”). 
158. Frances K. Porcher, Licensure, Certification, and Credentialing, in NURSE  
PRACTITIONERS: EVOLUTION OF ADVANCED PRACTICE 415, 433 (Mathy D. Mezey et al. eds., 4th  
ed. 2003) (emphasis added). 
159. Ellen D. Baer, Philosophical and Historical Bases of Advanced Practice Nursing Roles, in 
NURSE PRACTITIONERS: EVOLUTION OF ADVANCED PRACTICE 37, 38 (Mathy D. Mezey  
et al. eds., 4th ed. 2003) (“The passage of Medicare/Medicaid legislation in 1965 created an expanded 
demand for health services. The supply and distribution of primary care physicians was unable to meet 
this demand. In addition, the services demanded were broader in scope than those contained within the 
domain of medicine prior to the 1960s . . . . The nursing profession stepped into the breach.”); 
ELISABETH ROSENTHAL, AN AMERICAN SICKNESS 72 (2017) (“The use of physician extenders in the 
United States has its roots in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There was a perceived shortage of doctors, 
particularly in the area of primary care, as many more Americans got insurance and more doctors trained 
as specialists.”); Tine Hansen-Turton, Jamie Ware & Frank McClellan, Nurse Practitioners in Primary 
Care, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1235, 1242 (2010) (“The opportunities for nurses in primary care grew again in 
the 1960s as the country experienced a physician shortage following the adoption of the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs in 1965, which spurred greater demand on the health care system than before.”); 
John Michael O’Brien, How Nurse Practitioners Obtained Provider Status: Lessons for Pharmacists, 60 
AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 2301, 2032 (2003) (“In 1965, the Medicare and Medicaid programs 
provided health care coverage to low-income women, children, the elderly, and people with disabilities. 
The sudden availability of coverage increased the demand for expanded primary care services. Because 
physicians were unable to meet this demand, nurses ‘stepped into the breach.’”); Safriet, Health Care 
Dollars and Regulatory Sense, supra note 152, at 444 (observing that several events contributed to the 
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funding on the nurse practitioner movement cannot be forgotten,” and emphasized 
in particular the role that Medicare played: 
Grounded by generous federal funding for health professional education 
(the Training Acts of the early 1960s), this movement gained impetus 
through the changes wrought by Medicare (1966) and the state-federal 
partnership of Medicaid (in the late 1960s). These new federal and state 
entitlement programs came at a time when physicians increasingly 
specialized and the number of those providing general medical care 
declined, creating shortages in poor urban and rural communities. 
Medicare and Medicaid created access to acute and specialty medical care, 
which is where the bulk of the demand for health care resided. It increased 
the number and type of patients receiving health care services without 
substantially changing the system of health delivery . . . . With these 
changes came transformations in how physicians and nurses were 
educated, paid, and where and how they practiced.160 
More recently, the Affordable Care Act contributed to further easing scope of 
practice restrictions for non-physician providers. Once again, forecasts of tens of 
millions of individuals gaining health insurance amplified concerns about a 
physician shortage.161 In 2010, the year the ACA was signed into law, the 
Association of American Medical Colleges released a study predicting a shortage of 
63,000 doctors by 2015, with the ACA alone expected to be responsible for half 
that shortage.162 
Prominent media outlets published stories with ominous headlines, such as 
“Doctor Shortage Likely to Worsen with Health Law,”163 “Doctor Shortage, 
Increased Demand Could Crash Health Care System,”164 “Thanks to Obamacare, 
 
expansion of nursing in the mid-1960s, including the introduction of Medicaid and Medicare and the 
looming shortage of physicians). 
160. FAIRMAN, MAKING ROOM IN THE CLINIC, supra note 140, at 3. 
161. See, e.g., Bagley, Medicine As a Public Calling, supra note 65, at 63 (“Policymakers’ greatest 
immediate concern is a coming ‘doc shortage,’ especially a shortage of primary-care physicians, who 
were in short supply even before the ACA’s enactment.”); Peter D. Jacobson & Shelley A. Jazowski, 
Physicians, the Affordable Care Act, and Primary Care: Disruptive Change or Business As Usual?, 26  
J. GEN. INT. MED. 934, 934 (2011) (“With expanded access to primary care for millions of new patients, 
physicians and policymakers face increased pressure to solve the perennial shortage of primary care 
practitioners.”). 
162. AAMC Releases New Physician Shortage Estimates Post-Reform, AAMC (Sept. 30, 
2010), https://www.aamc.org/newsroom/newsreleases/2010/150570/100930.html [https://
perma.cc/H6W2-G5F9]. 
163. Annie Lowrey & Robert Pear, Doctor Shortage Likely to Worsen with Health Law,  
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2012, at A1. 
164. Jen Christensen, Doctor Shortage, Increased Demand Could Crash Health Care System, CNN 
(Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/02/health/obamacare-doctor-shortage/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/64RH-CSYB]. 
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A 20,000 Doctor Shortage Is Set to Quintuple,”165 and “Why the Doctor Can’t See 
You.”166 One CNN story quoted a doctor who darkly compared the ACA to “giving 
everyone an ATM card in a town where there are no ATM machines.”167 Some 
news reports observed that Massachusetts had experienced lengthy wait times for 
doctors’ appointments after passing its own health care reform law in 2006, a law 
which served a model for the ACA.168 
These concerns prompted numerous calls for expanding non-physician 
providers’ scopes of practice. Professional groups such as the American Association 
of Nurse Practitioners seized on the ACA as a reason in favor of loosening scope 
of practice restrictions.169 The National Governors Association advocated that 
states “reexamine their scope of practice laws governing nurse practitioners,” in part 
to meet the rising demand for health care due to the ACA.170 In his 2013 testimony 
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions 
(HELP), Uwe Reinhardt argued in favor of developing a national scope of practice 
regime that “reflect[s] the expertise of both . . . physicians and  
nurse practitioners.”171 
Other related factors played a role as well. For instance, the ACA itself 
included some specific provisions that further encouraged reliance on NPs, 
including additional funding for nurse training and nurse-managed clinics.172 
Perhaps most notably, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published an influential 
report in 2011 which recommended, among other things, that states reform their 
scope of practice laws to allow APNs “to practice to the full extent of their 
 
165. Sally Pipes, Thanks to Obamacare, A 20,000 Doctor Shortage Is Set to Quintuple, FORBES 
( June 10, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sallypipes/2013/06/10/thanks-to-obamacare-a-
20000-doctor-shortage-is-set-to-quintuple/#4658ec22322e [https://perma.cc/22XR-K43K]. 
166. John C. Goodman, Why the Doctor Can’t See You, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 14, 2012), https:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443404004577578980699719356 [https://perma.cc/
6U94-9R8G]. 
167. Christensen, supra note 164. 
168. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 165; National Health Preview, WALL ST. J. (May 10,  
2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703864204576313370527615288 [https://
perma.cc/S8TC-52XK]. 
169. Sarah Kliff, Obamacare Is Ramping Up a Health-Care Turf War, WASH. POST WONKBLOG 
(Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/02/27/how-obamacare-
is-ramping-up-a-health-care-turf-war/ [https://perma.cc/SMD3-FNM5] (“In Washington, D.C., and 
in state houses, the American Association of Nurse Practitioners is making the case that it’s time to 
broaden the scope of practice laws — and that the Affordable Care Act significantly strengthens their 
case.”). 
170. The Role of Nurse Practitioners in Meeting Increasing Demand for Primary Care,  
NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N (2012), https://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/
1212NursePractitionersPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C2D-SZLV]. 
171. 30 Million New Patients and 11 Months to Go: Who Will Provide Their Primary  
Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Primary Health and Aging of the H. Comm. On Health, Educ., 
Labor & Pensions, 113th Cong. 39 (2013) (statement of Uwe E. Reinhardt, Princeton University). 
172. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, §§ 5202, 5208, 124  
Stat. 119, 607 (2010). 
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education and training.”173 The IOM report specifically noted that the ACA 
rendered it more urgent to expand nurses’ scope of practice, warning that “overly 
restrictive scope-of-practice regulations” for APNs pose a “serious barrier” to care 
for the millions of people gaining coverage under the ACA.174 
Once again, partly in response to these pressures, states loosened their scope 
of practice restrictions for non-physicians, such as NPs and Physician Assistants.175 
Since the beginning of 2010, the year the Affordable Care Act was signed into law, 
ten states have expanded their scope of practice regimes for NPs to “Full Practice,” 
bringing the total number to twenty-two states and DC (as of June 2017).176 
According to one study, nearly 1800 state laws relating to scope of practice 
restrictions were proposed between 2011 and 2012, of which 350 were adopted.177 
Again, not all of these changes can be attributed to the ACA, but it played a 
contributing role.178 One article published in 2010 reported that twenty-eight states 
were considering expanding NPs’ scope of practice after the ACA’s passage, and 
provocatively speculated, “[a] nurse may soon be your doctor.”179 State legislators 
in Nevada and Connecticut explicitly invoked the ACA’s insurance expansion 
 
173. INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING HEALTH 
278 (2011). 
174. Id. at 85–86, 96. 
175. Matt Brothers, The PPACA’s Impact on the Scope of Practice of Nurse Practitioners, 23 
ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 79, 83 (2013) (“The passage of the PPACA already led to 
a flurry of state legislation regarding nurse practitioners. Much of this legislation is designed to ease 
restrictions on the scope of practice of nurse practitioners.”). 
176. Email from Michelle L. Cook, Vice President of Research, Am. Ass’n of Nurse 
Practitioners, to author ( June 23, 2017) (on file with author). The American Association of Nurse 
Practitioners defines “Full Practice” as follows: “[s]tate practice and licensure laws permit all [nurse 
practitioners] to evaluate patients; diagnose, order and interpret diagnostic tests; and initiate and manage 
treatments, including prescribing medications and controlled substances, under the exclusive licensure 
authority of the state board of nursing.” State Practice Environment, AM. ASS’N NURSE PRACTITIONERS, 
https://www.aanp.org/legislation-regulation/state-legislation/state-practice-environment [https://
perma.cc/2G7F-WNR3] ( last updated Dec. 20, 2018). 
177. Catherine Dower, Jean Moore & Margaret Langelier, It Is Time to Restructure Health 
Professions Scope-Of-Practice Regulations to Remove Barriers to Care, 32(11) HEALTH AFF. 1971, 1971 
(2013) (citing Scope of Practice Legislative Database, 2011–2013, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG.’S,  
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/scope-of-practice-legislation-tracking-database.aspx); see 
Adams & Markowitz, supra note 37 (“The current trend is toward more provider  
independence—known as fully authorized SOP—and fewer restrictions on practice (appendix figures 
1–3). For example, the number of states allowing completely independent practice and prescribing 
authority for CNMs more than tripled from 9 to 29 between 1994 and 2017 (Markowitz et al. 2017; 
authors’ calculations).”). 
178. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 504 (“The great concern over the shortage of primary care 
physicians to meet these goals is . . . fostering a push to expand practice opportunities for [APNs  
and PAs].”). 
179. Carla K. Johnson, Doctor Shortage? 28 States May Expand Nurses’ Role, MED. EXPRESS 
(Apr. 13, 2010), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2010-04-doctor-shortage-states-nurses-role.html 
[https://perma.cc/G924-8WXL]. 
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during the lead-up to passing laws expanding NPs’ scope of practice.180 Similarly, in 
2014, former Governor Steve Beshear of Kentucky explicitly linked the passage of 
a bill expanding NPs’ prescribing authority with concerns about the ACA causing a 
shortage of primary care physicians.181 Beshear later attested that although he 
believed that loosening scope of practice restrictions was warranted irrespective of 
whether the ACA had been enacted, his state would not have implemented changes 
to its scope of practice laws had it not been for the new health care law.182 
B. The HMO Act and the Erosion of the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine 
Medicaid and Medicare also played a crucial—though less direct—role in the 
erosion of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Health care spending growth 
continued unabated into the early 1970s, driven by cost growth for outpatient 
hospital services.183 Labor leaders and Democrats, led by Senator Edward Kennedy, 
increasingly pushed to enact a national health insurance program, and Kennedy 
released a report aimed at building support for his initiative titled “The Health Care 
Crisis in America.”184 
Only a few months after he took office in 1969, President Richard Nixon 
echoed this language, warning that the health care system faced a “massive crisis” 
stemming from “massively increasing demands in this field,” and that “unless action 
 
180. MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE ASSEMB. COMM. ON COMMERCE & LABOR, 77th 
Sess. (Nev. Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Minutes/Assembly/CL/
Final/326.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5VF-4T59]; MINUTES OF THE S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, LABOR 
& ENERGY, 77th Sess. (Nev. May 1, 2013), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Minutes/
Senate/CL/Final/1042.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LRF-LHXB]; MINUTES OF THE S. COMM. ON 
COMMERCE, LABOR & ENERGY, 77th Sess. (Nev. May 17, 2013), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/
77th2013/Minutes/Senate/CL/Final/1208.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK66-RWY6]; Arielle Levin 
Becker, Senate Votes to Allow Nurse Practitioners to Practice Independent of Doctors, CT MIRROR  
(Apr. 9, 2014), https://ctmirror.org/2014/04/09/senate-votes-to-allow-nurse-practitioners-to-
practice-independent-of-doctors/ [https://perma.cc/6HJA-ZHXU]. 
181. Anna Hartkeymeyer, Kentucky Broadens the Scope of Practice for Nurse Practitioners, 
COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS. ( July 25, 2014), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/kentucky-
broadens-scope-practice-nurse-practitioners [https://perma.cc/S3VQ-HDBG] (“‘As more people 
gain access to health care as a result of the Affordable Care Act, this bill is a step in the right direction 
to begin addressing the current and projected shortfall of primary care physicians in Kentucky,’ said 
Kentucky Governor Steve Beshear in a press release following the signing of Senate Bill 7.”). 
182. UNIV. OF PA. LEONARD DAVIS INST. OF HEALTH ECONS., LDI HEALTH POLICY 
SEMINAR WITH STEVE BESHEAR, JD: PEOPLE OVER POLITICS: THE SOLUTION TO OUR 
HEALTHCARE LOGJAM (2018). 
183. AARON C. CATLIN & CATHY A. COWAN, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 




184. Jennifer Evans & Jaclyn Schiff, A Timeline of Kennedy’s Health Care Achievements and 
Disappointments, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 17, 2010), https://khn.org/news/kennedy-health-
care-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/PB5M-2WD5]; see also PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION  
52–53 (2011). 
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is taken . . . we will have a breakdown in our medical care system which could have 
consequences affecting millions of people throughout this country.”185 Soon, the 
Nixon Administration began “casting about for a solution to the rising and 
seemingly uncontrollable costs of the Medicare and Medicaid programs that had 
helped to generate a climate of health care crisis that was troubling the Congress.”186 
As luck would have it, Thomas Joe, then a top assistant to John Veneman, the 
Under Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), 
reportedly encountered Dr. Paul Ellwood on a plane, where the latter reportedly 
sold him on the concept of “health maintenance organizations” (HMOs),187 hybrid 
health care organizations that both treat patients and offer insurance coverage in 
exchange for a fixed annual fee per patient.188 Ellwood, a pediatric neurologist and 
the founder of a Minneapolis-based think tank, is credited with coining and 
popularizing the term HMO,189 though such organizations—also referred to as 
prepaid group plans—date as far back as the 1930s.190 
Only a couple weeks after the fateful plane ride, Ellwood submitted a memo 
to the White House making the case for a “Health Maintenance Strategy,” just in 
advance of a meeting between high-level White House officials and HEW 
officials.191 Ellwood envisioned that HMOs would offer comprehensive care to 
patients in exchange for prepayment, and compete against each other and against 
traditional plans based on price and quality.192 Ellwood painted HMOs as a 
market-based alternative to enacting more regulations on health care services, an 
option that the Nixon Administration viewed as unpalatable.193 
The Administration proved receptive to Ellwood’s arguments, and in 1971, 
President Nixon made HMOs a central element of his “National Health 
Strategy.”194 Congress and the Administration were under pressure to curb rising 
 
185. President Richard Nixon, Remarks at a Briefing on the Nation’s Health System,  
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 10, 1969), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-
briefing-the-nations-health-system [https://perma.cc/82LU-HJN9]. 
186. Patricia Bauman, The Formation and Evolution of the Health Maintenance Organization 
Policy, 1970-1973, 10 SOC. SCI. & MED. 129, 130 (1976). 
187. KINGDON, supra note 24, at 6. 
188. Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost 
Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 436–37 (1988). 
189. Clark C. Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Health Services, 
35 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 716, 718–19 (1970). 
190. STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 184, at 54. 
191. Bauman, supra note 186, at 130–31. 
192. CARL F. AMERINGER, THE HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: FROM MEDICAL MONOPOLY 
TO MARKET COMPETITION 64 (2008). 
193. Paul M. Ellwood, Jr. et al., Health Maintenance Strategy, 9 MED. CARE 291, 295 (1971) 
(“The health maintenance policy is expected to substantially lessen the Federal government’s role in the 
planning and management of health programs, and therefore, should not be regarded as ‘just another 
Federal health program.’”). 
194. President Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress Proposing a National Health 
Strategy (Feb. 18, 1971), AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/ 
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health care costs, and a Presidential Commission had recently expressed support for 
prepaid practice as a promising organizational innovation to slow health care 
spending.195 Nixon himself was familiar with the most successful prepaid group 
plan, Kaiser Permanente, which was then the largest health care organization  
in California.196 
Importantly, both Ellwood and Nixon explicitly argued that Medicare and 
Medicaid had rendered the HMO Act necessary by increasing the demand for health 
care without simultaneously reforming the health care delivery system. Ellwood’s 
memo (a version of which was later published as an academic paper) blamed 
Medicare and Medicaid for increasing demand and cautioned against further 
expanding health insurance, warning that it would inexorably lead to  
more regulations.197 
Similarly, in President Nixon’s eyes, the HMO Act was a necessary response 
to Medicare and Medicaid, which had increased the demand for health care and 
spurred rising health care costs. In a 1972 speech advocating for his “National 
Health Strategy,” Nixon traced the necessity of the HMO Act back to Medicare  
and Medicaid: 
One basic shortcoming of a solution to health care problems which 
depends entirely on spending more money, can be seen in the Medicare 
and Medicaid programs. Medicare and Medicaid did deliver needed dollars 
to the health care problems of the elderly and the poor. But at the same 
time, little was done to alter the existing supply and distribution of doctors, 
nurses, hospitals and other health resources. Our health care supply, in 
short, remained largely the same while massive new demands were loaded 
onto it. The predictable result was acute price inflation, one basic cause of 
our health economic quandary of the past 11 years . . . . If we do not lessen 
this trend, all other reform efforts may be in vain.198 
In 1973, Congress passed the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Act 
to encourage the development of HMOs.199 The law promoted HMOs in several 
 
special-message-the-congress-proposing-national-health-strategy [https://perma.cc/7FJV-DU6X] 
[hereinafter Nixon, Special Message to the Congress Proposing a National Health Strategy]. 
195. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HEALTH MANPOWER: REPORT 66–68 (1967) 
(noting that Kaiser has lower hospital and outpatient utilization and costs than the rest of the United 
States). 
196. STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 184, at 54–55. 
197. Ellwood, Jr. et al., supra note 193, at 291. 
198. President Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Health Care (Mar. 2, 1972), 
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-
congress-health-care [https://perma.cc/JZF9-GEHY] [hereinafter Nixon, Special Message to the 
Congress on Healthcare]; see also Nixon, Special Message to the Congress Proposing a National Health 
Strategy, supra note 194 (“It does little good . . . to increase the demand for care unless we also increase 
the supply . . . . This axiom was ignored when Medicaid and Medicare were created-and the nation paid 
a high price for that error. The expectations of many beneficiaries were not met and a severe inflation 
in medical costs was compounded.”). 
199. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (2018). 
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ways, including providing grants and loans to develop and operate HMOs and 
requiring large businesses to offer an HMO in their benefit plan if possible.200 At 
the same time, it also required HMOs to meet certain conditions to be eligible for 
funding, such as offering a more generous set of benefits and not discriminating 
based on health status.201 
Most importantly for purposes of this Article, the law also promoted HMOs 
by undermining the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. The corporate practice 
prohibition could be invoked to prohibit HMOs, especially for-profit ones.202 At 
the time that the HMO Act was being debated in Congress, proponents of HMOs 
viewed the corporate practice of medicine doctrine as one of the major barriers to 
the development of HMOs.203 
The need for addressing the corporate practice doctrine was cited as part of 
the reason for enacting the HMO Act,204 and an early version of the Act explicitly 
preempted the corporate practice prohibition, at least as it applied to non-profit 
HMOs.205 Although the final version of the Act did not ultimately go that far, it 
made clear that any application of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine to 
prohibit the development of HMOs would be preempted.206 According to George 
Harris and Derek Foran, “[t]he HMO Act was instrumental in breaking down the 
barriers to corporate ownership of medical service providers.”207 
 
200. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-4, -9 (2018). 
201. STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 24, at 401. 
202. Robert T. Holley & Rick J. Carlson, The Legal Context for the Development of Health 
Maintenance Organizations, 24 STAN. L. REV. 644, 657–58 (1972) (“[I]t is clear that a majority of courts 
feels that the furnishing of medical care through a corporate structure is undesirable, and condemns 
organizations on that basis alone. Since HMOs are corporations, the rule will probably be applied to 
them.”); Philip C. Kissam & Ronald M. Johnson, Health Maintenance Organizations and Federal  
Law: Toward a Theory of Limited Reformmongering, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1163, 1184 (1976) (“All HMOs, 
particularly profitmaking ones, may be prohibited by application of the hoary, but occasionally viable, 
common law rule against the corporate practice of medicine.”); Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice 
in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HARV. L. REV. 887, 960 (1977) (“The common law rule that a 
corporation cannot engage in a ‘learned calling’ would appear, on its face, to bar incorporated prepaid 
group practice.”). 
203. Chase-Lubitz, supra note 46, at 481; Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 277. 
204. Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 277. 
205. The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, supra note 202, at 
962 n.52 (“The proposed Health Security Act . . . would eliminate the corporate practice rule for 
nonprofit participating organizations, provided an administrative board finds the arrangements are not 
likely to cause lay interference with professional acts or professional judgments.”). 
206. Chase-Lubitz, supra note 46, at 482 (“[A]ny application of the prohibition would conflict 
with the legislation so directly that preemption would appear certain.”); Kissam & Johnson, supra note 
202, at 1218 (“By implication the Act also preempts the application to qualified HMOs of the common 
law rule against the corporate practice of medicine.”). 
207. George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access to Legal Services 
and What We Can Learn from the Medical Profession’s Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM  
L. REV. 775, 814 (2001); see also Saver, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8, at 674 (“The federal HMO Act 
of 1973 is credited with jump-starting managed care and promoting HMOs as a viable alternative in the 
private market. It did so by preempting obstructive state laws for federally qualified HMOs and 
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Through the financial inducements it provided and these regulatory 
curtailments, the Act contributed to a dramatic expansion in HMOs across the 
country.208 Following the HMO Act, almost all of the states went further and 
specifically exempted HMOs from their corporate practice of medicine laws.209 
Although the Act’s regulatory requirements initially limited its effectiveness,210 
enrollment in HMOs doubled in the first half of the 1970s, and continued to grow 
throughout the late 1970s and through the 1980s.211 
Thus, by increasing demand for health care and spurring health care cost 
growth, Medicare and Medicaid led to the enactment of the HMO Act, which in 
turn contributed to the erosion of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. The 
end result is that while corporate practice prohibitions remain “legal landmines,” 
they are far less potent than they used to be.212 
C. The Health Costs Crisis and the Rise of Certificate of Need Laws 
The enactment of Medicare and Medicaid also contributed to the expansion 
of CON laws, through increasing the demand for health care and driving up 
government expenditures on health care. With the implementation of these new 
programs in 1966, millions of elderly and poor Americans gained health insurance 
coverage for the first time. That year alone, 18.9 million people enrolled in Medicare 
Part A (covering hospital services and nursing home care), 17.6 million enrolled in 
Medicare Part B (covering physician and other services), and 4 million enrolled in 
Medicaid.213 As more states implemented Medicaid, enrollment swelled to 17 
million by 1973, while Medicare enrollment inched upwards to 23.1  
million enrollees.214 
As referenced above, Medicare’s reimbursement structure also further 
increased the demand for health care. Initially, Medicare reimbursed physicians and 
hospitals on a retrospective fee-for-service basis (i.e., physicians and hospitals were 
reimbursed for whatever they spent), as long as their costs were “reasonable”215 
—a determination which was effectively left to the hospitals and physicians 
 
requiring certain employers to offer an HMO option as part of the health benefits available to 
employees in order to obtain favorable tax treatment for employee health expenses.”). 
208. Harris & Foran, supra note 207, at 817. 
209. Sara D. Mars, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: A Call for Action, HEALTH MATRIX 241, 
260 (1997). 
210. Gail B. Agrawal & Howard R. Veit, Back to the Future: The Managed Care Revolution, 65 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 32 (2002) (“The implementation of the HMO Act sputtered for several 
years after its enactment, due partly to the Act’s burdensome requirements and partly to bureaucratic 
mismanagement.”). 
211. Lynn R. Gruber, Maureen Shadle & Cynthia L. Polich, From Movement to Industry: The 
Growth of HMOs, HEALTH AFF. 197, 198 (1988). 
212. See Rosoff, supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
213. CATLIN & COWAN, supra note 183, at 9. 
214. Id. 
215. Medicare Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 102(a), § 1814(b), 79 Stat. 286, 296. 
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themselves.216 The regulations interpreting these provisions permitted hospitals to 
seek reimbursement for costs associated with directly providing patient care, as well 
as for “capital costs” (e.g., interest on debt, depreciation).217 
These developments soon led to spiraling health expenditures. Medicare’s 
reimbursement structure sparked a “medical arms race,” as hospitals competed 
based on who could adopt the latest costly new medical technology.218 Health care 
spending grew at an annual rate of 11.9% from 1966 through 1973, up from its 
8.9% rate from 1960 to 1965.219 The pace of health care price growth too began to 
accelerate, rising by 5.1% from 1966 to 1973.220 One estimate finds that Medicare 
alone was responsible for increasing hospital spending by nearly 40% between 1965 
and 1970.221 These trends were met with alarm. Christy Chapin observes that 
“[a]fter 1965, voters and policymakers discussed health care using terms customarily 
reserved for national catastrophes.”222 
Rising government expenditures stemming from Medicare (a federal program) 
and Medicaid (a joint federal-state program) placed growing budgetary pressure on 
both the federal government and the states. Between 1966 and 1967, the 
government’s share of health care spending increased from 24% to 29%.223 
Medicare expenditures alone reached $10.7 billion in 1973,224 while Medicaid 
spending reached $6.5 billion by 1971.225 
To stem these rising costs, state and federal policymakers implemented a raft 
of new regulations on physicians and hospitals to curb health care spending, the 
“chief manifestation” of which were Certificate of Need (CON) laws.226 CON laws 
varied in their structure and approach, but they generally required that the 
government certify that there was an existing health need before allowing new 
 
216. Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats, supra note 20, at 527. 
217. See generally Eleanor D. Kinney & Bonnie Lefkowitz, Capital Cost Reimbursement to 
Community Hospitals Under Federal Health Insurance Programs, 7 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 648,  
649 (1982). 
218. JAMES C. ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 23–25 (1999); see also 
Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law, supra note 25, at 86 (“The uncontrolled moral hazard 
inherent in these financing arrangements eventually gave rise to unprecedented cost escalation, as 
benefit/cost ratios were almost totally neglected in physicians’ clinical choices and, consequently, also 
in decision making on capital spending and technological development.”). 
219. CATLIN & COWAN, supra note 183, at 8. 
220. Id. at 10. 
221. Finkelstein, The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance, supra note 122. 
222. CHAPIN, supra note 45, at 234. 
223. CATLIN & COWAN, supra note 183, at 11. 
224. Id. at 9. 
225. John D. Klemm, Medicaid Spending: A Brief History, 22 HEALTH CARE FINANCING  
REV. 105, 106 (2000). 
226. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by “Certificate of Need,” supra note 
70, at 1143. 
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health care facilities to enter the market or existing facilities to make large capital 
investments.227 
Soon after the implementation of Medicaid and Medicare, CON laws began 
to proliferate. In 1964, just one year before the passage of Medicare and Medicaid, 
New York became the first state to enact its own CON law in response to rising 
hospital costs.228 Yet it was only after the implementation of Medicaid placed 
growing fiscal pressures on state governments that other states followed suit.229 In 
part responding to this pressure, by 1972, twenty states had adopted their own CON 
laws.230 
The federal government too turned to CON laws to stem rising health care 
spending. In 1966, Congress passed the Comprehensive Health Planning and 
Services Act, which provided funding for state and local agencies to coordinate their 
planning activities and to provide broader access to health care.231 In 1972, Congress 
built on this momentum by passing legislation giving the Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare the authority to deny Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement 
for health care facilities’ capital expenditures if the state had not certified them as 
meeting a community need.232 This latter legislation was explicitly designed to 
address the perverse incentives created by Medicare and Medicaid’s  
open-ended reimbursement provision for capital expenditures.233 
In 1974, Congress passed the National Health Planning and Resources 
Development Act (NHPRDA), which offered funding to state CON programs and 
required them to meet federal standards or else forgo eligibility for Medicare and 
Medicaid.234 Like the previous federal planning statutes, the NHPRDA was largely 
intended to address mounting health care spending, which was in turn driven by 
Medicare and Medicaid.235 
 
227. Simpson, supra note 64, at 1025 
228. Payton & Powsner, supra note 66, at 209–10. 
229. STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 24, at 398 (“Impelled by rising costs, state 
governments led the way toward stiffer regulation of the health care industry. New York in 1964 had 
been the first state to regulate capital expenditures of hospitals and nursing homes, but few followed 
its example until soaring Medicaid expenditures at the end of the decade obliged state legislatures to 
take action.”). 
230. Id.  
231. Comprehensive Health Planning and Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 246 (1966). 
232. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–603, § 221, 86 Stat. 1329, 1386 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §1320a-1 (2014)); Simpson, supra note 64, at 1038. 
233. Simpson, supra note 64, at 1038 (“The Social Security Amendments of 1972 contained 
several measures designed to restrain Medicare and Medicaid program cost increases caused by 
incurred-cost reimbursement.”). 
234. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–641, 
88 Stat. 2225 (1975) 
235. Id. (“The massive infusion of Federal funds into the existing health care system has 
contributed to inflationary increases in the cost of health care . . . . Increases in the cost of health care, 
particularly of hospital stays, have been uncontrollable and inflationary.”). 
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Again, of course, there were multiple forces responsible for the proliferation 
of CON laws. For instance, larger hospitals found CON laws appealing as a means 
of forestalling more serious government regulation and reducing competition.236 
The “legitimacy of professional dominance” that had long existed in health care 
began to erode.237 CON laws also built on a tradition of “health planning” initiatives 
that Congress had previously endorsed by enacting the 1946 Hill Burton Act.238 
Nevertheless, Medicaid and Medicare played a decisive role by triggering 
spiraling health expenditures and drastically increasing the government’s share of 
the burden. Sallyanne Payton and Rhoda Powsner have written that the 
implementation of Medicare and Medicaid represented “a watershed in the 
developing relationship between government and the hospitals.”239 Whereas 
previously, “government had been a bystander in what was principally a private 
sector problem,” Medicare and Medicaid precipitated “the need and the desire to 
act, driven by [the government’s] own self-interest as a major purchaser of medical 
services . . . in containing its own financial liabilities.”240 Paul Starr offers a similar 
assessment, writing that the “distinctive factor” that explains the “growing health 
care regulation of the 1970s” is “that a large share of medical costs had been 
socialized . . . [and that] [g]overnment[s], employers, and commercial insurers 
balked at both the rise in costs and the uncertainty that inflation created  
for them.”241 
Some readers may view this account of the rise of CON laws as a cautionary 
tale, since CON laws subsequently fell out of favor and have been roundly criticized 
as ineffectual and anti-competitive.242 Their emergence in the aftermath of Medicare 
and Medicaid may illustrate the responsiveness of the delivery system to changes in 
health insurance, but it also shows that the delivery system reforms that result from 
this process are not guaranteed to be successful. 
More recently, however, some scholars have concluded that the problem with 
CON laws was not that they were enacted in the first place, but rather that they did 
not go far enough, for example, by giving regulators the authority to control hospital 
prices.243 In recent years, more health law scholars have begun to advocate for 
reinstituting economic regulation of the health care sector, and more specifically, 
for regulating health care prices.244 Thus, even if CON laws did not have their 
 
236. See Payton & Powsner, supra note 66. 
237. ROBINSON, supra note 218, at 30. 
238. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by “Certificate of Need,” supra note 
70, at 1148. 
239. Payton & Powsner, supra note 66, at 259. 
240. Id. at 259–60. 
241. STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 24, at 403. 
242. See supra Part I.C. 
243. HALL, BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 56, at 1225. 
244. See, e.g., TRACY YEE ET AL., NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM, RESEARCH BRIEF 
NO. 4, HEALTH CARE CERTIFICATE-OF-NEED LAWS: POLICY OR POLITICS? 1 (2011) (“As health care 
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intended effect, they still represented a defensible policy response to the problem 
of rising health care costs. 
 
*         *         * 
 
To review, health care financing laws have played a central role in shaping the 
landscape of health care delivery laws through shifting the public’s demand for 
health care. The enactment of Medicaid and Medicare—and to a lesser extent, the 
ACA—increased the demand for health care through at least three  
channels: increasing access to health care; encouraging providers to deliver 
additional services; and creating incentives that encouraged the development and 
proliferation of expensive new technologies over time. The resulting increase in 
demand in turn exacerbated concerns about reduced access to health care and rising 
health care costs (and in particular government expenditures on health care), which 
in turn caused regulators to enact new regulations—or change existing ones—in 
order to address these problems. 
These forces have helped to shape the landscape of health care delivery laws 
today. Out of the three areas of health care delivery law outlined in this Article, two 
(the corporate practice of medicine doctrine and scope of practice restrictions) 
predated the widespread availability of health insurance and have been substantially 
weakened by the expansions of insurance under Medicare, Medicaid, and the ACA, 
whereas the origins of the remaining one (Certificate of Need laws) can be traced 
back to the expansion of health insurance under Medicare and Medicaid. 
To be sure, health care financing laws are not the only forces responsible for 
these changes in health care delivery laws. For instance, other factors besides the 
HMO Act, such as the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision that upheld a Federal Trade 
Commission order finding the AMA’s ethical codes in violation of federal antitrust 
laws, contributed to the erosion of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine.245 
More generally, as Louise Trubek has emphasized in her work on the New Health 
Governance, physicians, payers, and consumers have played important roles in 
encouraging policy experimentation and new approaches to regulating health 
 
spending continues to grow more rapidly than the nation’s economy, there is renewed interest in 
certificate-of-need regulation as a way to improve health planning and help control spending growth.”); 
Bagley, Medicine As a Public Calling, supra note 65, at 62 (arguing that “if the market-oriented approaches 
that are ascendant today prove unsatisfactory, public utility regulation is an option worth exploring”); 
Barry R. Furrow, Cost Control and the Affordable Care Act: CRAMPing Our Health Care Appetite, 13 
NEV. L.J. 822, 850 (2013) (“State governments might revisit the merits of rate regulation, which proved 
unpopular in the 1990s and was largely abandoned. More direct regulation of provider rates might set 
upper bounds on permissible rates negotiated between health plans and providers in relation to 
Medicare rates.”); Fuse Brown, supra note 80, at 85 (“It is time to resurrect rate regulation and place it 
squarely in the center of any policy strategy to control health care prices and spending.”). 
245. Am. Med. Ass’n v. F.T.C., 455 U.S. 676 (1982); see also Chase-Lubitz, supra note 46,  
at 475–78. 
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care.246 Nevertheless, health care financing laws have played a prominent role in 
creating the conditions leading to these changes in health care delivery laws. 
Moreover, although I have solely focused on three areas of health care delivery 
laws, there are other examples of how expanding health insurance coverage has 
prompted reforms to delivery system regulations. Perhaps most prominently, both 
the Medicare/Medicaid legislation and the Affordable Care Act contributed to the 
enactment of more stringent fraud and abuse legislation. Congress enacted the  
Anti-Kickback statute and the Stark Law in response to the concern that Medicare’s 
reimbursement structure was incentivizing providers to engage in unnecessary or 
inappropriate care.247 A few decades later, the Affordable Care Act included a 
panoply of anti-fraud provisions, including amendments to the Stark and  
Anti-Kickback laws, increases in anti-fraud budgets, and new disclosure 
requirements for health care providers.248 
While a full exploration of the origins of these reforms is beyond the scope of 
this Article, Joan Krause suggests that there may be a more general relationship 
between health care financing laws and fraud and abuse laws. She observes that 
“[h]ealth care fraud is primarily a crime of opportunity, an opportunity created by 
the vast sums of money that flow through our complicated health care 
reimbursement system,” and posits that “[a]ny effort to increase the number of 
people who participate in that system – as health care reform clearly aims to  
do – risks an increase in fraud unless countermeasures are taken.”249  Thus, the 
overall impacts of health insurance expansions on delivery system laws likely go well 
beyond the specific effects described in this Article. 
IV. POLITICAL AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
Uncovering these interactive effects shows that health care financing laws are 
largely responsible for health law’s “dynamism.” In contrast to the perception of 
health care delivery laws—and health law in general—as stagnant and inflexible, the 
history that has unfolded since the adoption of Medicare, Medicaid, and the 
 
246. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek, New Governance Practices in U.S. Health Care, in LAW AND 
NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 249 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); 
Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139 (2006). 
247. See generally Krause, Integration, Fragmentation, and Human Nature, supra note 11,  
at 858–59. 
248. Joan H. Krause, Following the Money in Health Care Fraud: Reflections on a Modern-Day 
Yellow Brick Road, 36 AM J. L. MED. 343, 366 (2010) (citing Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010)); see also Jeffrey 
B. Hammond, What Exactly Is Healthcare Fraud After the Affordable Care Act?, 42 STETSON  
L. REV. 35, 38 (2012) (“Taken in its entirety, the [ACA] represents the largest single, collective change 
to federal fraud and abuse law since the creation of the Medicare and the Medicaid programs.”). 
249. Joan H. Krause, Following the Money in Health Care Fraud, supra note 247, at 368–69; see 
also Joan H. Krause, Fraud in Universal Coverage: The Usual Suspects (and Then Some), 55  
U. KAN. L. REV. 1151, 1151 (2007) (“[W]ith few exceptions, health care fraud is a crime of opportunity 
rather than one of desperation. Thus, any reform effort that increases the opportunities to commit 
fraud, such as increasing the number of players in the health care system and the obligations imposed 
on them, may well end up losing more money to fraudulent activities.”). 
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Affordable Care Act shows that these laws have contributed to numerous regulatory 
reforms designed to improve access to health care, ensure quality, and reduce health 
care spending. Far from remaining fixed, health care delivery law has been in flux 
for the last half-century: repeatedly undergoing a variety of complex changes in 
response to increases in demand stemming from health care financing laws. 
Recognizing this dynamic relationship has two primary implications for the 
future of health care reform: First, it implies that further expanding health insurance 
would generate political pressure for additional reforms to the health care delivery 
system. Second, it strengthens the case for further expanding health insurance 
coverage. I argue that health law’s dynamism is normatively desirable since it is 
better able to address problems of access, costs, and quality; to adapt to other 
changes in the underlying health care system; and to facilitate policy learning. 
A. Should Delivery System Reform Come Before Health Insurance Reform? 
The question of whether to prioritize expanding health insurance coverage 
(sometimes referred to as demand-side health care reform) or reforming the health 
care delivery system (sometimes referred to as supply-side reform) has long bedeviled 
health care policymakers. President Nixon complained that the Johnson 
Administration had enacted Medicare and Medicaid without increasing the supply 
of health care providers.250 During the lead-up to the passage of the ACA, one 
reported source of tension within the Obama Administration was how much to 
prioritize tackling health care spending by reforming the delivery system versus 
expanding health insurance coverage.251 
Several economists and legal scholars appear to view expanding health 
insurance coverage and health care delivery reform not merely as distinct goals, but 
as ones that are in competition with one another.252 For instance, Richard Epstein 
and David Hyman have argued that deregulation of the health care delivery system 
“in ways that will increase quality and reduce the cost of health care” should be 
prioritized over further expanding health insurance, and have warned that that 
pursuing universal health insurance first will only further lock us into “the current 
dysfunctional state of affairs.”253 
 
250. See Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Health Care, supra note 198. 
251. See, e.g., BRILL, supra note 16, at 113 (“The economic team wanted to use reform to bend 
the cost curve . . . [whereas the] healthcare reform policy team . . . wanted to expand coverage.”). 
252. See, e.g., Cochrane, supra note 12, at 162 (“I focus on the supply and demand for health 
care, which gives this essay a bit of novelty. Curiously, most of the current policy debate, and most of 
our regulation, focuses on health insurance, the question of who will pay the bill, as if the market for 
health care were functioning normally.”); Alex Tabarrok, Supply Side Health Care Reform, MARGINAL 
REVOLUTION (Mar. 27, 2017), https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2017/03/supply-
side-health-care-reform.html [https://perma.cc/HKZ6-MF5J] (“We fight over health care policy 
because we focus on demand and redistribution. We could reach greater agreement if we focused on 
supply and innovation.”). 
253. Epstein & Hyman, supra note 22, at 516. 
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By contrast, this Article suggests that the opposite is true. Far from being in 
competition with delivery system reform, improving health insurance coverage can 
act as a catalyst to reforming delivery system laws. Although there are still powerful 
political economy constraints that favor the status quo in health care, expanding 
health insurance coverage is one way to overcome these constraints and enact 
meaningful reforms to health care delivery laws. 
Contrasting today’s health care delivery system with the one that preceded the 
enactment of Medicare and Medicaid helps to bring the effects of expanded 
insurance coverage into sharper relief. Until the 1970s, the health care delivery 
system “had long been static.”254 Most physicians operated as solo practitioners, 
largely insulated from competition, and free from control by corporations and 
hospitals.255 The laws governing the health care delivery system—such as the 
corporate practice of medicine doctrine and licensing laws—served to support and 
preserve this system.256 
The health care delivery system today is unrecognizable from the one that 
existed roughly half a century ago.257 The past several decades have witnessed the 
enactment of a plethora of new laws governing health care professions and 
hospitals, as well as modifications and outright repeals of preexisting delivery 
system regulations and doctrines. These changes did not happen all at once, but 
rather in fits and starts. In the realm of fraud and abuse laws alone, Congress 
enacted new legislation at least seven times between the 1970s and 1996.258 Some 
regulatory changes—such as CON laws—have been enacted, only to be 
substantially scaled back shortly thereafter. 
The proliferation of health insurance coverage by laws such as Medicare and 
Medicaid has helped to drive these regulatory changes. Given interest groups’ 
intense efforts to preserve the status quo,259 and their opposition to controlling 
health care spending in particular,260 it seems possible that it will take further 
increases in the demand for health care to precipitate a sufficiently salient and 
 
254. Agrawal & Veit, supra note 210, at 12. 
255. Id. 
256. Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155, 162 (2004) 
(“The model of professional authority dominated health law and policy in the United States from about 
1880 to about 1960. During this period the main point of health law-its more or less conscious  
purpose-was to support the authority and autonomy of individual physicians engaged in the private 
practice of medicine.”). 
257. See Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law, supra note 25, at 85 (“Once upon a 
time, the U.S. health care industry was not beset on all sides by law and lawyers. Indeed, when I first 
surveyed the field of health law in the late 1960s, the list of emergent legal issues in health care was 
quite short.”). 
258. Id. at 90. 
259. See generally FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, JEFFREY M. BERRY, MARIE HOJNACKI, DAVID  
C. KIMBALL & BETH L. LEECH, LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND 
WHY (2009). 
260. See REINHARDT, supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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broad-based concern about health care costs that the government will finally enact 
more effective cost-control measures. This hypothesis appears supported by John 
Kingdon’s work on agenda setting, in which he has argued that the perception of a 
problem or a crisis is one of the key factors in determining whether a particular issue 
rises to the top of policymakers’ agendas.261 
This same logic has been applied to a number of other contexts.262 For 
instance, former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson has argued that it took the 
failure of Lehman Brothers during the 2008–2009 financial crisis to force Congress 
to take the unpopular legislative measures that, in his view, were necessary to stave 
off an even greater economic disaster.263 Ten years after Lehman’s failure, speaking 
for himself, Former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, and Former Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve Benjamin Bernanke, Paulson says: “the . . . thing which 
we’ve all said is it takes a crisis to get Congress to act.”264 Similarly, in 2008, Rahm 
Emanuel, then-Chief of Staff to President-Elect Obama famously said, “you never 
want a serious crisis to go to waste . . . Things that we had postponed for too long, 
that were long-term, are now immediate and must be dealt with. This crisis provides 
the opportunity for us to do things that you could not do before.”265 Scholars have 
linked other prominent crises such as the thalidomide tragedy in the 1950s, the 
Three Mile Island nuclear accident, and the Love Canal pollution disaster, with 
important regulatory and legislative changes.266 
Of course, expanding health insurance coverage is distinguishable from these 
examples in that it is not in itself a “crisis.” Rather, there are strong independent 
justifications for seeking universal health care coverage. As described above, a 
growing body of empirical research finds that health insurance expansions improve 
financial wellbeing, access to health care, physical and mental health outcomes, and 
reduce mortality in certain areas.267 Yet in solving one problem (inadequate 
insurance coverage), the government has historically exacerbated concerns about 
preexisting problems with the health care system, as well as budgetary concerns, and 
in doing so, it has created greater pressure to reform the health care delivery system. 
 
261. See KINGDON, supra note 24, at 90–115. 
262. Daniel Carpenter & Jisela Sin, Policy, Tragedy, and the Emergence of Regulation: The Food, 
Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 STUD. AMER. POL. DEV. 149, 153 (2007) (“The claim that regulation 
follows certain critical events (either actual events or journalistic exposes) is common to historians of 
numerous fields of regulation.”). 
263. Panic, Fear and Regret, MARKETPLACE (Mar. 20, 2018), https://features.marketplace.org/
bernanke-paulson-geithner/ [https://perma.cc/J8JX-HMAD] (“[O]ne thing the Lehman shock  
did was energized the system politically, and that was . . . what it ended up taking for us to get  
these emergency authorities to let us to recapitalize the whole financial system and avoid a  
catastrophe . . . . But it took an emergency to get them to act.”) 
264. Id. (emphasis added). 
265. Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 21, 2008), https:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/SB122721278056345271 [https://perma.cc/2L57-JEN6]. 
266. Carpenter & Sin, supra note 262, at 153. 
267. See, e.g., Sommers, Gawande & Baicker, supra note 89. 
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Importantly, while expanding health insurance tends to lead to reforming 
delivery system laws, it does not determine the direction that that reform will take.268 
For instance, historically, opponents of expanding health insurance coverage have 
been wary that doing so would lead to greater government involvement in health 
care.269 These concerns were not completely unfounded: Medicare and Medicaid 
did contribute to the enactment of CON laws, after all. However, as this Article 
shows, in some instances, health insurance expansions have (perhaps surprisingly) 
contributed to scaling back delivery system regulations. For instance, Medicare, 
Medicaid, and the ACA have indirectly contributed to the loosening of scope of 
practice restrictions governing non-physician health professionals, and to the 
weakening of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. (The genesis of the HMO 
Act in particular—which reportedly was precipitated by a chance encounter 
between Paul Ellwood and a Nixon administration official on a plane270—suggests 
there is nothing preordained about the form that a particular policy solution will 
take.) Thus, it is possible that achieving universal health insurance will have both 
regulatory and deregulatory effects. 
In sum, in contrast to the prevailing view, expanding health insurance coverage 
is in fact an effective way to overcome the political obstacles to reforming health 
care delivery and make the regulatory system more capable of change. Would-be 
delivery system reformers thus have reason to desire expanding health insurance 
coverage, rather than treating these delivery system reforms as being in tension with 
expanding health insurance coverage. 
B. Is Dynamism Normatively Desirable? 
Having a dynamic system means that regulators are continually in the process 
of evaluating and amending delivery system regulations, then monitoring and 
assessing the consequences of those amendments in practice, making further 
changes when necessary, and so on. This dynamism has three primary advantages 
in the context of health care delivery system regulations: it creates pressure to enact 
reforms to improve health care access, costs, and quality; it enables delivery systems 
 
268. See Carpenter & Sin, supra note 262, at 178 (“Our general conclusion, then, is that crises 
can in fact ‘lead to’ or ‘cause’ regulation, but the way in which they do so is politically contingent on the 
action of framing, an action that no one actor can entirely control.”). 
269. For example, the American Medical Association historically opposed efforts to establish a 
national health insurance program on the grounds that doing so would lead to radical incursions on 
physicians’ autonomy and “socialized medicine.” See, e.g., CHAPIN, supra note 46, at 160 (“AMA leaders 
understood that once third parties controlled the capital flowing through the health care system then 
doctors would occupy a defensive position, both professionally and economically. Cost containment 
measures would inevitably entail diminished doctor sovereignty.”); STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, 
supra note 184, at 45 (describing how Ronald Reagan delivered a speech as part of an AMA campaign 
against the Medicare legislation, in which he explained that “[t]he Medicare bill . . . was part of a larger 
plot to bring socialism to America” and that “[s]oon the government would be telling doctors where to 
practice”). 
270. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
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regulations to adapt to other changes in the health care system; and it facilitates 
policy learning. 
1. Prompting Policies to Address Access, Costs, and Quality 
As described above, health economists and policymakers have historically 
been quite concerned that expanding health insurance coverage would lead to excess 
demand for health care, and that the total costs of expansion would therefore exceed 
the total benefits.271 John Nyman notes that beginning in the 1970s, the 
predominance of moral hazard theory led “generations of health economists . . . to 
view health insurance as problematic,” and suggests that the predominance of this 
view explains why “few American health economists during this period called for 
the creation of a national health insurance program.”272 
Recognizing the dynamic relationship between health insurance and regulatory 
reform reveals an important but overlooked wrinkle in this discussion. It shows 
that, precisely by increasing the demand for health care, the expansion of coverage 
generates pressure for policymakers to enact regulatory reforms which aim to 
address problems of access, costs, and quality. These reforms are framed as being 
necessary to prevent or mitigate unintended effects stemming from the increased 
demand for health care, but the problems they focus on (e.g., access, costs) are 
persistent problems in any health care system. These regulatory responses have been 
largely unappreciated and even unnoticed. Although some economists have 
investigated how health insurance expansions have affected the health care system 
as a whole over time, they typically have treated the regulatory environment as fixed, 
and have not accounted for any corresponding regulatory adaptation.273 
Part III shows a few ways in which expanding health insurance coverage has 
prompted regulators to enact policies aimed at improving health care access and 
 
271. See supra notes 95–100 and accompanying text. 
272. Nyman, American Health Policy: Cracks in the Foundation, supra note 89, at 765. In recent 
years, economists’ views toward the expansion of health insurance appear to have become more 
favorable, possibly in response to the critiques of moral hazard theory or to the empirical evidence 
about the value of health insurance. For instance, a 2015 survey of a group of prominent academic 
economists found that over two-thirds of them either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, 
“[e]xpanding health insurance to more people through the ACA’s public subsidies and Medicaid 
expansion will generate gains in the health and well-being of the newly insured that exceed the costs,” 
while nearly one-quarter was either uncertain or disagreed. Chi. Booth, Health Insurance Subsidies, IGM 
FORUM (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/health-insurance-subsidies [https://
perma.cc/Y5PG-EXG7]. Nevertheless, concerns about excess demand stemming from health 
insurance remain influential today. 
273. See Finkelstein, The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance, supra note 122, at 2 (“The basic 
insight is that market-wide changes in health insurance may have fundamentally different effects on the 
health care sector than what partial equilibrium analyses such as the Rand Experiment would suggest.”). 
Curiously, one exception is physician shortages: some health scholars argued that the ACA would not 
lead to a physician shortage, in part based on the assumption that states were likely to revise their scope 
of practice laws. See Scott Gottlieb & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, No, There Won’t Be a Doctor Shortage,  
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2013, at A35. 
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costs. For instance, several states have loosened their scope of practice restrictions 
in response to concerns that expanding health insurance coverage would reduce 
access to health care by leading to a physician shortage. Loosened scope of practice 
restrictions have in turn served to increase the number of health care providers and 
improve patients’ access to health care, especially for rural and vulnerable 
populations.274 The proportion of primary care being provided by NPs and 
Physician Assistants has increased substantially in recent years,275 and states with 
more expansive scope of practice laws have more NPs, greater growth in NPs, and 
more care provision by NPs.276 
Similarly, the erosion of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine has likely 
played a role in curbing health care spending. The enactment of the HMO Act and 
the erosion of the corporate practice doctrine also contributed to the “managed care 
revolution,” which in turn led to a moderation in health care spending growth 
during the 1990s.277 Managed care companies helped to limit physician and facility 
fees and curb unnecessary care.278 Partly as a result, health care spending slowed for 
more than a decade, and barely budged at all from 1993 to 1998.279 Although the 
rise of managed care ultimately precipitated a political backlash, it continues to play 
an important role in controlling health care spending today.280 
 
274. See, e.g., Adams & Markowitz, supra note 37, at 6 (“By unnecessarily limiting the tasks that 
qualified APPs [advanced practice providers] can perform, SOP [scope of practice] restrictions 
exacerbate [primary care] shortages and limit access to care. At the same time, researchers have not 
found evidence that less-restrictive SOP is associated with any diminution of quality or any harms to 
public health.”); Diane Alexander & Molly Schnell, Just What the Nurse Practitioner Ordered: Independent 
Prescriptive Authority and Population Mental Health (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper  
No. 2017-8, 2019) (finding that broadening prescriptive authority for Nurse Practitioners is associated 
with improvements in mental health and decreases in mortality related to mental health); Morris  
M. Kleiner, Allison Marier, Kyoung Won Park & Coady Wing, Relaxing Occupational Licensing 
Requirements: Analyzing Wages and Prices for a Medical Service, 59 J.L. & ECON. 261 (2016) (finding 
that more stringent scope of practice restrictions for NPs increase the price of well-child visits without 
any evidence of improved health outcomes). 
275. See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer & Laurie Bauer, Rethinking the Primary Care Workforce  
— An Expanded Role for Nurses, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1015 (2016); Hillary Barnes, Michael  
R. Richards, Matthew D. McHugh & Grant Martsolf, Rural and Nonrural Primary Care Physician 
Practices Increasingly Rely on Nurse Practitioners, 37 HEALTH AFF. 908 (2018). 
276. See Ying Xue et al., Impact of State Nurse Practitioner Scope-of-Practice Regulation on Health 
Care Delivery: Systematic Review, 64 NURSING OUTLOOK 71, 73 (2016). 
277. See Agrawal & Veit, supra note 210, at 41 (“The managed care industry did slow health care 
spending. Thirty years of data showed that managed care plans brought hospital costs under control by 
eliminating unnecessary hospital stays and by limiting hospital lengths of stay.”); Uwe E. Reinhardt, The 
Predictable Managed Care Kvetch on the Rocky Road from Adolescence to Adulthood, 24 J. HEALTH  
POL. POL’Y & L. 897, 905 (1999) (“The managed care industry also can take credit for having been 
instrumental in breaking, at long last, the intolerable upward spiral in American health spending that 
had been driven for decades by the old, ‘employer-provided’ health insurance system.”). 
278. Clark C. Havighurst, Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard Politics Make Bad 
Policy, 34 IND. L. REV. 395, 396–97 (2001). 
279. Agrawal & Veit, supra note 210, at 42. 
280. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker, Michael Chernew & Jacob Robbins, The Spillover Effects of 
Medicare Managed Care: Medicare Advantage and Hospital Utilization, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 1289 (2013) 
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Although Part III focuses primarily on initiatives to address health care access 
and costs, it briefly outlines how Medicare and Medicaid contributed to the 
enactment of fraud and abuse laws that were intended to prevent over-utilization, 
as well as “excess commercialization” and “distorting incentives” that might 
interfere with the quality of patient care.281 Although the current fraud and abuse 
regime is far from perfect, even some of its most fervent proponents of deregulation 
in health care concede that it serves a necessary role in guarding against unnecessary 
care.282 
That is not to claim that every regulatory change stemming from health care 
financing laws is ideal, or that it always improves efficiency. As most clearly 
illustrated by the example of CON laws, regulators will inevitably on occasion 
“overshoot the optimal mark.”283 Yet even in the case of CON laws, which have 
been subject to nearly uniform criticism in recent years, different health scholars 
have drawn different lessons from the nation’s experience with those laws—and 
some scholars now view economic regulation of the health care sector as the most 
promising means of controlling prices.284 Thus, although there is no guarantee that 
regulators will always enact optimal policies, having a dynamic regulatory system 
means that at least regulators are capable of changing delivery system regulations to 
address problems of access, costs, and quality, and they may continue to adjust their 
policy responses until they have the intended effect. 
2. Adapting to Other Changes in the Regulatory Environment 
A dynamic regulatory system is also able to evolve in response to other 
changes in the underlying health care system, such as technological developments 
or new modes in delivering patient care.285 A regulatory scheme designed to fulfill 
 
(finding that enrollment in Medicare managed care leads to declining hospital costs both in the 
Medicare and commercially insured population); David Dranove, Christopher Ody & Amanda Starc, 
A Dose of Managed Care: Controlling Drug Spending in Medicaid, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 23956, 2017) (finding that Medicaid managed care organizations reduce drug 
spending); see also Trubek, New Governance Practices in U.S. Health Care, supra note 246, at 249 (“The 
managed care backlash came about in part by an alliance between physicians and consumers to fight 
the intrusion of the ‘outsiders’ into the physician-patient relationship. Although physicians won this 
battle, managed care had changed the environment in which they practised through the development 
of large integrated hospital and clinic systems, where most physicians now practise; the creation of 
evidence-based medicine; and increased reliance on allied health care professionals.”). 
281. HALL, BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 56, at 1372. 
282. Epstein & Hyman, supra note 22, at 533 (“We do not suggest repeal of the anti-kickback 
statute. Although we believe those responsible at HHS should create more safe harbors and be more 
flexible in their interpretation of the statute in advisory opinions, the statute is an important guardian 
of the fiscal integrity of the Medicare program, given that the overwhelming majority of Medicare 
beneficiaries are still in the traditional (fee-for-service) part of the program, where kickbacks pose an 
obvious incentive for overutilization.”). 
283. Saver, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8, at 675. 
284. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
285. See Elhauge, Health Care Fragmentation, supra note 7, at 16 (“Indeed, the level and types of 
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one purpose may become unnecessary (or give rise to unintended consequences) if 
the surrounding environment changes. For instance, it is widely believed that  
anti-fraud and abuse laws need to be revised as the health care system shifts away 
from fee-for-service reimbursement toward value-based payment.286 
One especially vexing problem for regulators is how to adapt regulations in 
the face of innovation.287 If regulations remain fixed and constant, then they risk 
stifling beneficial innovations. This has long been one of the primary critiques of 
health law: that it is stagnant and path dependent, and suppresses innovations that 
would otherwise improve the health care delivery system.288 In addition, static 
regulatory schemes are also thought to be more vulnerable to “bad” innovations 
aimed at subverting or bypassing regulatory protections.289 
Again, there are reasons to think that these considerations are especially 
important in the context of health care delivery regulations, given the necessity of 
developing modes of delivering patient care that are higher-quality and more  
cost-effective. Peter Jacobson, Laura Napiewocki, and Leah Voigt emphasize the 
necessity of having a dynamic regulatory system that evolves in response to changes 
in technology and health care delivery: 
[T]he goal of regulation should be to facilitate market arrangements rather 
than to replace them. To achieve this goal, the regulatory approach must 
be dynamic and flexible. That is, regulators must be able to respond to 
innovative market arrangements within a realistic length of time. Most 
important, the regulatory framework must better reflect changes in how 
health care is organized and how physicians deliver care. It must also 
facilitate needed changes in the delivery system, yet retain flexibility to 
adapt to new ways of providing health care.290 
 
integration that are most effective are likely to change over time with changes in technology, costs, and 
consumer preferences, just as they do in other industries, so it is important to maintain a legal 
framework that allows such shifts over time.”); see also Wendy Wagner, William West, Thomas McGarity 
& Lisa Peters, Dynamic Rulemaking, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 242 (2017) (arguing that perhaps the most 
important normative advantage of dynamism in the context of administrative rulemaking is that “an 
agency may employ dynamic rulemaking to adapt to changes in the physical, technological, or policy 
environment in which it operates.”). 
286. See, e.g., Carmel Schachar, Are Fraud and Abuse Laws Stifling Value-Based Care?, NEW 
ENG. J. MED. CATALYST (Sept. 12, 2018), https://catalyst.nejm.org/fraud-and-abuse-laws-stifling-
value-based-care/ [https://perma.cc/X7D5-HJQX?type=image]. 
287. See generally CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION AND THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND 
JUSTICE 144 (2017) (inquiring “whether it is possible to develop a regulatory approach whose 
fundamental underlying assumptions include . . . the default presumption that innovation will be 
continually changing the regulatory context and object, undermining and potentially circumventing 
regulation, and potentially obscuring or making irrelevant its stated purposes.”). 
288. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text. 
289. Cary Coglianese, Innovation and Regulatory Vigilance, JOTWELL (Oct. 19, 2018),  
https://adlaw.jotwell.com/innovation-and-regulatory-vigilance/ [https://perma.cc/MF3U-XDGV] 
(reviewing CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION AND THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND JUSTICE 
(2017)). 
290. Jacobson, Napiewocki & Voigt, supra note 14, at 587–88. 
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Dynamic regulations are particularly important in parts of the health care 
system where technology is evolving quickly.291 For instance, Nicholson Price has 
advocated for a “flexible, adaptive approach” to regulating what he calls “Black Box 
Medicine,” health care providers’ growing reliance on opaque algorithms in 
delivering medical care.292 To the extent that expanding health insurance creates the 
conditions for policymakers to reform and readjust health care delivery laws, they 
will be more flexible and better able to adapt to these types of developments. 
3. Facilitating Policy Learning 
Finally, a dynamic regulatory system facilitates policy learning. It enables 
policymakers to experiment with riskier policies that may be desirable because of 
their potential benefits, or because they may help to elicit knowledge about the best 
regulatory approach.293 It does so because if regulators do implement policies that 
turn out to be unsuccessful, then they are able to correct them at a later stage; by 
contrast, if the policies are successful, then they may retain them.294 
Scholars have long emphasized the importance of dynamism in facilitating 
policy learning and leading to the development of better regulations.295 For instance, 
some scholars in the field of “New Governance” have advocated for “adaptive” 
regulations that “continuously generate new learning and . . . adjust in response to 
new information and changing conditions.”296 Similarly, several scholars have 
promoted the notion of “adaptive management,” which is thought of as “an 
 
291. Sharon B. Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 519, 572 (2017) (arguing that 
a “decentralized, incremental, or experimentalist” regulatory approach is appropriate for “complex and 
rapidly developing technology”). 
292. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 459 (2017). 
293. See Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 534 (2008) 
(emphasizing the desirability of “reversibility” in policy because of the potential of  
high-variance/low-expected-value policies to “provide better outcomes and better knowledge”). 
294. Id.; see also Wagner, West, McGarity & Peters, supra note 285, at 242 (“Dynamic rulemaking 
has many desirable characteristics. Most would agree that it is needed to correct errors in previously 
promulgated rules.”). 
295. See, e.g., Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19  
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959). 
296. Bradley C. Karkkainen, ‘New Governance’ in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting 
As Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 474 (2004); see, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Renew 
Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89  
MINN. L. REV. 342, 395–96 (2004) (“The regulatory model has often proved stagnant and sluggish, 
curtailing revision and improvement . . . . While regulation has been an ordering act, governing is a 
learning process. The new model is better positioned to accept uncertainty and diversity, advancing 
iteratively toward workable solutions. The role of law is to promote practices that allow revision  
and improvement.”); David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal  
Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 542 (2007) (“The 
continual change and expansion of knowledge which characterize society means that all solutions 
should be regarded as provisional. Given this situation, it seems preferable for legislators to develop 
broad frameworks, but let stakeholders develop concrete solutions based on easily revisable rules.”). 
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iterative, incremental decisionmaking process built around a continuous process of 
monitoring the effects of decisions and adjusting decisions accordingly.”297 
Although this Article has primarily emphasized how expanding health 
insurance coverage influenced changes in delivery system laws, policy learning 
played a role in these changes as well. For instance, as described above, the ongoing 
curtailment of scope of practice restrictions has been influenced by a body of 
evidence that some non-physician providers can deliver a broader array of services 
without compromising the quality of patient care.298 
Certificate of Need laws present another example of policy learning, albeit an 
incomplete one. Congress repealed the federal pro-CON law in 1987, leading 
several other states to repeal their own CON laws thereafter—though the drive to 
repeal CON laws appears to have stalled in recent years.299 One factor contributing 
to the decline of CON laws was that policymakers increasingly began to  
believe—based in part on a burgeoning body of empirical research—that these laws 
were ineffective at controlling health care spending.300 
Promoting policy learning is especially important in the context of health care 
delivery system regulations, given that there is substantial epistemic uncertainty 
surrounding the appropriate strategy for regulating the delivery of health care. 
Timothy Jost and Ezekiel Emanuel have written that although the current delivery 
system “fails to generate optimal results, the best alternative is unknown,” and “it is 
unlikely that there is a single best way to organize and deliver health care services.”301  
Kieran Walshe and Stephen Shortell survey health care regulators and regulated 
entities and find substantial variation as to these parties’ beliefs about the optimal 
regulatory approach.302 To the extent that the regulatory system is dynamic and 
policymakers are able to reverse course in the future, the effects of any negative or 
unintended outcomes created by pursuing these policies will be minimized. 
Of course, dynamism by itself is not sufficient to guarantee policy learning. 
There is a danger that regulators may careen haphazardly from one regulatory 
approach to another, without learning from past experiences. Yet dynamism is a 
necessary condition for policy learning: the more dynamic a system is (i.e., the easier 
it is for regulators to change course in the future), the less costly it is for regulators 
 
297. J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI.  
& TECH. 21, 28 (2005). Holly Doremus calls this process “learning by doing.” Holly Doremus, 
Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in Natural Resource Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 
550 (2007); see, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive 
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the 
Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424 (2010). 
298. See supra note 37. 
299. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
300. See Bagley, Medicine As a Public Calling, supra note 65, at 89; Conover & Sloan, supra note 
73, at 456–57. 
301. Jost & Emanuel, supra note 7, at 2561. 
302. See Walshe & Shortell, supra note 27, at 92. 
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to experiment with policies that are likely to yield the most information about the 
best policy.303 Moreover, just as health insurance expansions create pressure for 
policymakers to experiment with regulatory reforms, they may also encourage policy 
learning by rendering certain policy problems more salient, and by generating 
“natural experiments” which researchers can then evaluate and use to inform future 
policy design.304 
 
*         *         * 
 
To be sure, dynamic regulations are not appropriate in every context. For 
instance, dynamism may be undesirable for regulations that apply primarily to 
individuals or small businesses, given that—unlike larger and better-resourced 
regulated entities—they may not have sufficient capacity to understand and comply 
with regulations that are often changing.305 Dynamism may also be inappropriate 
for areas of regulation that signal strong normative commitments (such as civil 
rights or child labor laws), where frequent tinkering might appear to undermine the 
strength of those commitments.306 
Still, there are reasons to think health law’s dynamism is, on balance, a positive 
force for improving health care delivery. A dynamic regulatory system in health care 
is able to address problems of access, costs and quality, to adapt to other changes 
in the underlying health care system, and to facilitate policy learning and correct 
regulatory missteps. These virtues are particularly important in health care, which is 
characterized by increasing demand, rapidly evolving technology and modes of 
delivering patient care, and substantial uncertainty as to the proper approach to 
delivering health care. 
CONCLUSION 
In contrast to the perception of delivery system laws as stagnant and 
antiquated, this Article shows that they are continually being revised and amended, 
and that this dynamism is a neglected strength of health law. That is not to deny the 
problems with the current regulations governing the delivery of health care. Yet it 
shows that by increasing the demand for health care, laws that expand health 
insurance coverage have cascading effects on the health care delivery system over 
 
303. See Listokin, supra note 293, at 534. 
304. For instance, there have been numerous recent high-quality empirical studies that have 
exploited the expansion in health insurance coverage under the ACA to study the effects of health 
insurance on financial security, health care access, and health outcomes. See, e.g., Sommers, Gawande 
& Baicker, supra note 89. 
305. See Jonathan H. Adler, Dynamic Environmentalism and Adaptive Management: Legal 
Obstacles and Opportunities, 11 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 133, 154 (2015) (“A system in which agencies were 
free to recalibrate regulatory obligations would provide little certainty for regulated entities . . . . Insofar 
as agencies maintain discretion to alter their decisions, they risk upsetting the expectations of those that 
have relied upon the agency’s decision.”). 
306. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 297, at 25. 
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time, in ways that frequently heighten preexisting concerns about access, costs,  
and quality. 
This conclusion has clear implications for the future of health care reform. 
First, it shows that expanding health insurance coverage helps to build momentum 
for reforming health care delivery laws. Thus, counterintuitive though it may seem, 
one way to achieve more fundamental reforms to delivery system laws—and to 
delivery of health care—would be to further expand health insurance coverage. 
Second, recognizing this relationship strengthens the normative case for 
further expanding health insurance coverage. It shows that that the doing so helps 
to generate pressure for regulatory reforms to improve health care access, costs, and 
quality; it enables delivery systems regulations to adapt to other changes in the health 
care system, such as new technologies and new modes of delivering patient care; 
and it facilitates policy learning. 
This dynamic relationship also has implications for the field of health law. 
Health law scholars have long grappled with the perception that health law is a 
“patchwork” of complex and divergent laws with little internal coherence.307 This 
is at least in part because health law lacks many of the features of more traditional 
legal fields: it has no single unifying legal form; it has no central institutional actor; 
and it has evolved often by historical accident rather than through a more linear 
orderly process.308 
Health law scholars have responded to this perception in different ways: some 
have argued that health law deserves recognition as a distinct field because it 
addresses a unique set of relations among persons and because the law 
accommodates these relations in distinctive ways.309 Others have tried to show that 
a specific analytical or normative paradigm—such as a market approach or a 
patients’ right approach—explains the features of health law.310 
By contrast, rather than trying to impose a single unifying framework,  
M. Gregg Bloche argues that health law is best understood as an “emergent system,” 
 
307. See, e.g., Bloche, supra note 26, at 321 (“The law of health care provision is a chaotic, 
dysfunctional patchwork.”); Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1452 
(1994) (“Health law policy suffers from an identifiable pathology . . . . [H]ealth care law borrows 
haphazardly from other fields of law, each of which has its own internally coherent conceptual logic, 
but which in combination results in an incoherent legal framework and perverse incentive structures.”). 
308. Theodore W. Ruger, Health Law’s Coherence Anxiety, 96 GEO. L.J. 625, 627 (2008). 
309. Einer Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE FOREST  
L. REV. 365, 371 (2006) (“It seems to me that health law does meet the above functional test for what 
constitutes a field of law. Many different legal fields may, in some sense, apply to the health care 
industry but seem transformed in significant ways by the application . . . . The distinctiveness of health 
care relations thus does seem to change the applicable law.”); Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of 
Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 362–63 (2006) (“[H]ealth care 
law is an academic sub-discipline that inquires how law should and does take account of the special 
features of medicine and treatment relationships.”). 
310. Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Where Is the “There” in Health Law? Can It Become a 
Coherent Field?, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 101, 102 (2004). 
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one arising from “[c]ountless market actors, public planners, and legal and 
regulatory decisionmakers interact[ing] in oft-chaotic ways, clashing with, 
reinforcing, and adjusting to each other.”311  He argues that health law should be 
treated as a distinct field because better understanding these interactions is an 
essential prerequisite for figuring out how to improve the health care system, and 
because “legal scholars and practitioners who specialize in health care . . . are best 
situated to see how the moving parts fit together.”312 
This Article shows one important way in which “the moving parts fit 
together,” and in doing so, it illustrates the importance of studying health law 
holistically. These dynamic interactions and the lessons drawn from them suggest 
that it is not an arbitrary choice to have a field of law organized around the health 
care system: examining health law holistically enables health law scholars to uncover 
interactive effects that reverberate throughout different parts of the health care 
system and to chart important relationships and effects that bear on the future of 
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